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The Face of AIDS: Connections Between Political Leadership and Effective Approaches
to the AIDS Epidemic in Uganda and South Africa
Director: Peter Koehn
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has devastated sub-Saharan Africa. It affects every aspect of
society. Two of the most stricken countries are Uganda and South Africa. How their
national governments have responded to, and approached, the AIDS epidemic varies.
This thesis asks: does presidential leadership make a difference in HIV/AIDS
prevalence? The correlation between presidential leadership and HIV/AIDS is analyzed
against the historical background from which each administration rose using Rosberg and
Jackson's typology of personal-rule coupled with Gordon's characteristics of an effective
and creative leader and the World Health Organization's 1986 recommendation for a plan
of action in the African region.
Uganda is the most successful HIV/AIDS prevention case in Africa. It is the only
country in sub-Saharan Africa where the incidence of HIV/AIDS has decreased. Under
President Yoweri Museveni, Uganda became the first African country to acknowledge
the seriousness and severity of the ADDS epidemic. Uganda's government vowed to
focus its efforts on fighting the disease, and responded actively. Through an autocratic
style of leadership, Museveni has embodied Gordon's characteristics and has enabled
Uganda to ftilfill WHO's recommendations. In addition to a decrease in HIV/AIDS,
condom use has increased substantially among young people. There has also been a
subsequent rise in the age of first sexual intercourse and in monogamy.
South Afiica is home to the largest population of HTV/AIDS victims on earth. Five
million people lived with the disease at the end of 2001. Denial, ministerial wrangling,
and the misallocation of resources characterize South Africa's governmental response to
the AIDS epidemic under President Mbeki. The result is that the HIV/AIDS epidemic in
South Africa is escalating and the population is feeling its demographic and social
impact. Utilizing an autocratic leadership style, Mbeki failed to realize Gordon's
characteristics or lead South Africa to meet WHO's recommendations. Attitudes about
HIV, sex, and condoms have been slow to change in South Africa. There, sexual
behavior has remained dangerous and condom use low. HIV prevalence in antenatal
clinics continues to rise. Where people have not modified their behavior, rates increase.
Lack of strong presidential leadership has meant little change in attitudes about
HIV/AIDS among South Afiicans.
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To my dreams come true
Derek, Ella, and Liliana;
my breath, my light, my life.
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Never before has man had such a capacity to control his own destiny, to end thirst and
hunger, to conquer poverty and disease, to banish illiteracy and massive human misery.
We have the power to make this the best generation of mankind in the history of the
world—or make it the last.
John F. Kennedy, 1963
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INTRODUCTION

Sub-Saharan Africa has more than two times the number of people living with
HIV/AIDS than the rest of the world combined. According to the AIDS Epidemic
Update, published in December 2002 by the United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
(UN AIDS), and the World Health Organization (WHO), 29 4 million of the 42 million
people currently living with HIV/AIDS are in sub-Saharan Africa. There, the adultprevalence rate, the proportion of adults 15 to 49 years of age infected with HIV/AIDS, is
currently a staggering 8.8 percent, more than 80 times higher than Australia and New
Zealand's adult-prevalence rate of 0 1 percent, and more than 7.33 times the average
global adult-prevalence rate of 1.2 percent. In more insular terms, three percent of the
world's population, located in what is referred to as the "AIDS Belt," has close to 55
percent of the world's HIV/AIDS cases.'
The AIDS Beh extends from the Republic of Congo, through the Central African
Republic and Southern Sudan, through Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania to Malawi, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, Botswana, South Africa, and Namibia. In the Belt, monitoring agencies
classify HIV infection as generalized, which means that the HIV prevalence rate is at
least five percent.^ The HIV/AIDS epidemic has devastated Sub-Saharan Africa, and
affects every aspect of society Two of the most affected countries are Uganda and South
Africa. How their national governments have responded to the AIDS epidemic varies.
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This thesis asks: does presidential leadership make a difference in HIV/AIDS
prevalence?
History of HIV/AIDS in Siib-Saharan Africa
The story of the disease known as Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
begins in 1979 and 1980, when doctors in the United States observed clusters of
extremely rare diseases that occurred because of immunosuppression/ Groups of
unusual diseases that had previously been extremely rare in young adults in the West
characterized the initial syndrome/ Doctors first recognized AIDS in Los Angeles after
five young homosexual men were hospitalized with Pneumocystis carinii (PCP), a type of
pneumonia carried by birds/ PCP is often fatal and known to occur only in people with
weakened immune systems/ The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) published the first
official announcement on June 5, 1981, in its weekly bulletin, the Morbidity and Morality
Weekly Report (MMWR) ^ One month later it reported a clustering of twenty-six cases of
Kaposi's sarcoma (KS) in New York, adding that doctors identified an additional ten
cases of PCP in California, bringing the total since September 1979 to fifteen/ Kaposi's
sarcoma is a disfiguring cancer that shows up in purplish or brown blotches that usually
appear on the arms and legs, but can appear on the face and other parts of the body It
can become extremely invasive, attacking the internal organs and had been seen only in
elderly men/ Subsequently, the number of cases of both diseases - which mainly
centered on New York and San Francisco - rose rapidly Scientists realized that they
were dealing with something new
On August 28, 1981, the CDC announced that it had registered 108 patients, most of
whom were young men, of which 94 percent were homosexual/' In the course of 1982,
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the CDC, the United States National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Pasteur Institute, and
the World Health Organization (WHO) had defined the clinical characteristics of the new
disease/^ Officials identified more and more patients with similar symptoms outside of
the gay community, including injection drug users (IDUs), prostitutes, and hemophiliacs.
The medical community noted that the disease was not restricted to the United States, but
that doctors had observed it throughout the world. The CDC gave the new disease an
acronym: A I D S. In the beginning, this set of initials signified Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome; now it is generally interpreted as the abbreviation of Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome

By the end of 1982, more than five hundred people had

died of AIDS in the United States.
By 1983, the first report in the medical literature indicated that AIDS had been found
in wealthy Africans seeking medical treatment in Europe. The medical community
quickly learned that AIDS had been spreading rapidly through parts of central Africa.
Reports of AIDS were coming from Zaire, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia.'"^ Officials
also issued reports of the disease in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East.
The world health community began to see AIDS as an international epidemic.
The acronym AIDS is short for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome. The "A"
stands for Acquired, which means that the virus does not spread through casual or
inadvertent contact, rather a person has to do something, or have something done to them,
which exposes him or her to the virus. The "I" and "D" stand for Immunodeficiency
The virus attacks the human immune system and renders it less capable of fighting
infections. The immune system becomes deficient. The "S" is for Syndrome. AIDS is
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not one disease. It presents itself as a number of diseases that come about as the immune
system fails, and is, therefore, regarded as a syndrome/^

Magnitude of HIV/AIDS
AIDS has gained worldwide recognition because of its rampant spread and enormous
death toll. AIDS has developed into a global pandemic. According to the most recent
publication of the United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)/World Health
Organization (WHO) AIDS Epidemic Update, published in December 2002,
approximately forty-two million people around the world are living with AIDS. The
global summary of the HIV/AIDS epidemic estimates that there were five million people
newly infected with HIV in 2002.'^ Nearly three quarters, or seventy percent, of those
infected live in sub-Saharan Africa, where the average adult-prevalence rate is the highest
on earth. The epidemic has already claimed more than 13 7 million Africans.'^ More
than seventy percent of the total AIDS cases, 29 4 million, are in sub-Saharan Africa.
That region is where more than 88 percent of children with AIDS live today, and where
more than 78 percent of AIDS deaths occurred in 2001

HIV/AIDS is the first global

epidemic in sixty years. There is no known cure, and treatment is extremely expensive.
In 1984, scientists identified Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) as both the
antecedent and cause of AIDS.

HIV belongs to a family of viruses called Retroviridae

Viruses are essentially "a piece of nucleic acid surrounded by bad news."^" According to
Barnett and Whiteside, the virus works by entering the body and attaching itself to host
cells, HIV attacks cells known as CD4 cells, of which there are two types: positive T
cells and macrophages. HIV enters these cells and copies the human DNA, making itself
unidentifiable and impossible to destroy by the body's defense mechanisms. Once the
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virus replicates, it destroys the host cell, and moves on to infect more cells. Over time,
the infection destroys the immune cells triggered to fight the virus at a more rapid pace
than they are generated. Slowly, the number of CD4 cells falls from the average of
approximately 1200 CD4 cells per microlitre of blood to below 200 At this point,
opportunistic infections, which are infections by organisms not normally causing illness
because the body's immune system usually excludes them, occur, and the person is said
to have AIDS.
At a subregional program meeting held in Brazzaville, South Africa, in March 1986,
the World Health Organization's Regional OflSce for Africa (WHOAFRO)
acknowledged that AIDS was becoming a major public-health concern in many areas of
the world, including Africa.

At the meeting, officials developed recommendations for a

plan of action for AIDS control in the African region of WHO because all countries were
threatened by the virus, and neither therapeutic agents nor vaccines were available for the
treatment or prevention of AIDS. The committee recommended that actions including,
education and information, assurance of safe blood and blood products, and avoidance of
non-sterile needles, syringes, or other skin-piercing instruments be undertaken in order to
avoid the further spread of AIDS/^
The WHOAFRO recommendation states that a comprehensive strategy on AIDS must
start at the operational level with creation of a National AIDS Committee, a Task Force,
or the like. This Committee, with representatives from health, social services, education,
and other relevant sectors, should have coordinating and operational functions. The
National Committee must develop details of a national strategy, which include three
major components: 1) initial assessment of the AIDS situation in the country, along with
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evaluation of existing resources, 2) strengthening of the health infrastructure in order to
support epidemiological, laboratory, clinical, and preventative activities, and 3) education
and information programs regarding AIDS and its prevention, directed to the general
public, risk groups in the population, and health care workers at all levels.
The recommendation asserts that the initial assessment should determine the
prevalence of AIDS infection through epidemiological surveillance and serosurveys of
selected populations. The WHOAFRO recommendation further suggests the evaluation
of the ability of the existing health infrastructure to support epidemiological surveillance
and studies, laboratory testing, clinical case identification and management, and that
health infrastructure be strengthened. The recommendation insists upon the
establishment of laboratory capability and resources to support epidemiological and
clinical diagnosis. Personnel training and the provision of equipment and reference
materials are required to assist in establishing and maintaining surveillance activities. In
addition, resources are necessary for epidemiological research to determine risk factors,
modes of transmission, and other locally relevant epidemiological factors.
In its recommendation, the WHOAFRO regards education and information for the
public, and to risk groups within the population, as essential. It is viewed as vital that at
the operational level, general guidelines and available knowledge regarding risk factors
and modes of HIV transmission be converted into specific, useful educational materials
suitable to the local or national audience. The members of the World Health
Organization's Regional Office for Africa determined it essential to make the public fully
aware of the nature of AIDS and HIV, the modes of transmission, and its importance as a
health concern. The members found it imperative to place emphasis on the feasibility of
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preventing HIV infection and on teaching how AIDS transmission does not occur through
casual contact with infected persons. The recommendation suggests that health care
personnel should be encouraged to educate patients and members of the general public
about AIDS, and ways of avoiding HIV infection.Generally, the recommendations for
a plan of action in the African region of WHO, drawn up in March 1986, consisted of
initial assessment at the national level, the strengthening of health infrastructure in order
to support epidemiological, laboratory, clinical and prevention activities, educational and
informational programs to the general public, risk groups, and health care workers, and
the exchange of information, including reporting of AIDS cases.
By the end of 1989, with the exception of Libya, Madagascar, Mauritania, and
Seychelles, every national government in Africa reported at least one case of AIDS

In

their book. The Geogi'aphy of AIDS, Shannon, Pyle, and Bashur wrote that at the end of
February 1990, seven countries comprised the AIDS "belt" Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia. The seven countries accounted for 30,512
reported cases of AIDS—approximately 74 percent of the total 45,516 cases reported for
all countries in Africa. In addition to those "core" countries, officials reported high levels
of confirmed cases of AIDS from countries in an extension of the "belt" westward
through the Congo, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast, as well as through Zimbabwe and
Malawi. When those five countries are included, the "epidemic belt" countries of central
and eastern sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 38,067 reported AIDS cases, or 92 percent
of the total number of cases reported for all of Africa. Five of those countries—Burundi,
Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, were among the 42 poorest nations in the
world.

By February 1990, 48 countries had reported more than one case of AIDS.
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Effects of HIV/AIDS in Sub-Sahamn Africa
Many national governments refused to acknowledge that their country had an
HIV/AIDS problem. The reasons are numerous. The AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan
Africa has led to significant negative effects for her people. AIDS has severely affected
development in most sub-Saharan nations.

The consequences of the epidemic are

apparent across the social, political, and economic spectrum in health, education,
industry, agriculture, human resources, and daily life. The demographic impact of the
AIDS epidemic has led to the destabilization of Africa south of the Sahara.In places
where HIV prevalence is the highest, all demographic indicators have been affected —
population growth has slowed, crude death rates are higher, life expectancies have fallen,
improvements in infant and child mortality rates have been reversed, orphan populations
have increased, fertility has declined, population structure has been transformed, and the
dependency ratio has risen.
All mortality indexes are higher in sub-Saharan African countries because of the
impact of HIV/AIDS. For the 1998 round of population estimates and projections
prepared by the U.S. Census Bureau, AIDS mortality was incorporated into the 28
countries most severely affected by the AIDS pandemic, of which 21 were African.
According to the UNAIDS AIDS Epidemic Update, released in December 2001, about
one-in-nine South Africans, or 4 7 million people are living with HIV/AIDS. In 1970,
South Africa's midyear population was 22,740,000 people, and in 1980, it was
29,252,000 people. In 1990, the population escalated to 38,176,000 people and in 2000,
the country's population numbered 43,421,000 people. In the 10 years between 1970 and
1980, the growth rate was 2.5 percent. The period between 1980 and 1990 had a growth
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rate of 2,7 percent. The following decade saw a substantial drop in population growth,
falling 1 4 percent from the previous ten years to a rate of only 1.3 percent. The Census
Bureau estimates that the population growth rate in South Afnca will decrease by half of
one percent between the years 2000 and 2010, and continue to decrease by up to 1 1
percent a decade until 2040, which translates to a growth rate reduction of more than 75
percent by the year 2010. Not only are populations projected to grow more slowly or not
at all, but crude death rates are escalating rapidly as well.
Crude death rates are the number of people per 1000 who die. The 1998 World
Population Profile shows the dramatic difference between expectations without AIDS and
the expectations because of AIDS. The study estimates that for Botswana, South Africa,
and Nigeria, crude death rates in 1998 would have been 8.6, 7.8, and 10.9 persons per
1,000 respectively However, AIDS has significantly driven the numbers up to 20.9,
12.3, and 13 persons. For Botswana, the difference is more than 240 percent. By the
year 2010, considering AIDS and its toll, Botswana is expected to have a crude death rate
of 23 8 persons compared to 6.4 persons per 1,000 if AIDS were not a factor South
Africa can compare 17 8 persons to 7 1 persons. Nigeria can expect a crude death rate of
16.1 persons as opposed to 7 1 persons without AIDS. Crude death rates in nearly every
part of sub-Saharan Africa are on the rise.^^
Statistically, however the most apparent demographic impact of AIDS is on life
expectancy Life expectancy is a basic measure of human welfare and the impact of
AIDS.^^ In 1950, life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa was only 40 years. Forty years
later, due to substantial progress in the fight against infectious disease, life expectancy
increased 23 years to an average of 63 years. Four countries in sub-Saharan Africa now
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have Hfe expectancies of less than forty years: Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, and
Swaziland.If AIDS were not a factor in determining life expectancy, the average for
sub-Saharan Africa would be almost 15 years higher, about 62 years instead of the
current average of approximately 47 years. In 1997, the World Bank projected that for
sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, life expectancy by 2020 will be 43 years. If AIDS did not
exist, life expectancy would be a much higher 62 years.^^ The AIDS epidemic has
reduced life expectancies by 4 to 25 years in those countries most severely affected. The
UNDP's Human Development Report from 1992, 1994, and 1997 illustrate the marked
change in life expectancy for several countries in Southern Africa. Two of the most
notable examples, Botswana and Zimbabwe, show how the AIDS epidemic stopped the
upward trend in the mid to early 1990s. In Botswana, the life expectancy in 1960 was 46
years. By 1975, the life expectancy had increased by seven years to 52 years and
continued to increase, reaching 60 years by 1990. In 1992, life expectancy reached a
record high of 65 years. The pendulum began to swing the other way as AIDS began to
claim so many lives. By 1994, the thirty-year rise was over In two years, life
expectancy fell to the levels of 1975, decreasing a dramatic 13 years, from 65 years to 52
years.
The AIDS epidemic affects everyone in sub-Saharan Africa, but the children are those
hardest hit. UNAIDS estimated that by the end of 2002 nearly 90 percent, or 2.8 of the
3.2 million children, those under the age of 15, living with HIV/AIDS were living in SubSaharan Africa.^^ Between 1981 and 1986, Africa as a whole experienced a decrease in
under-5 child mortality

In 1987, an upward trend in morality attributed to AIDS

occurred, and child mortality rates continue to rise as more and more infants are bom
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HIV-positive in badly affected countries.More than 30 percent of all children born to
HIV-infected mothers in sub-Saharan Africa become infected with the fatal v i r u s . I n
2001, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS and WHO estimated that in
Zimbabwe, approximately 70 percent of deaths among children under five are due to
aidsThe

US Census Bureau estimated that in 1996, Zimbabwean infant-and child-

mortality rates were 25 and 43 percent higher, respectively, than they would have been
without AIDS/' In Zimbabwe, the Bureau estimated the infant mortality rate to be 72
percent higher in 1998 than it would have been without AIDS. However, many children
who infected with HIV-AIDS at birth survive beyond their first birthday
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, two-thirds of AIDS deaths among children will
occur after age one, causing child mortality rates to escalate. In Nigeria, the projected
child mortality rate is 65 percent higher than it would be if AIDS were not a factor
Those countries in East and Southern Africa that had seen a decrease in child mortality
before the AIDS crisis will see an even more elevated percentage. By the year 2010,
Kenya's estimated child mortality rate is 130 percent higher than without AIDS. In
Zimbabwe, child mortality will be three times as high as it would have been in the year
2010 without AIDS.
Many children will die, but for those spared from such a premature death, many will
be left parentless. UNAIDS estimates that by the year 2010 there could be as may as 42
million orphans in sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, 95 percent of all orphans live in
Africa, Before the AIDS epidemic, orphans in developing countries comprised only
about two percent of child population. By 1997, the proportion of orphans climbed to
seven and in some places even eleven percent. In a report published by UNICEF and the
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UN AIDS Secretariat in 1999, AIDS orphans are at a greater risk of malnutrition, illness,
abuse, and sexual exploitation than children orphaned by other causes, AIDS orphans
must grapple with the stigma and discrimination so often associated with AIDS, which
can deprive them of basic social services and educationThe director of Health
Economics and HIV/AIDS Research Division at the University of Natal, Alan Whiteside
stated:
The most obvious way children are affected is through orphaning. But, they're really
orphaned before the death of their parents. Orphaning is a series of events, with the
death of the parent the culminating one. We are ending up with millions of children
who are unloved, unsocialized, and uneducated.'*^
In some areas, more than half the children under 15 have lost a parent.Most adults
dying of AIDS perish before they are forty years old, when they are likely to have young
dependent children. The epidemic has doubled the rate of orphanhood.'*^
Behavioral and biological changes arising from the HIV epidemic can have
consequences for fertility trends.'*^ Women who know that they are HIV positive may
avoid pregnancies. Women most often become infected during their reproductive years.
Increased mortality rates correlate into decreased fertility rates. Studies also indicate that
HIV infection lowers fertility through biological mechanisms. In their article "HIV and
fertility changes in rural Zimbabwe," Grieser et al. found that in Zimbabwe the difference
in fertility between seropositive and seronegative women was as much as 25 percent. In
that study, the conclusion was that such a significant decline is not explainable by
behavioral change or condom use alone. There is evidence that HIV-positive women are
less able to conceive than their HIV-negative counterparts are."*^ In many places, despite
the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, there is still a stigma attached to the disease. Society,
family, and friends often shun people who either admit to being positive, or in some
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cases, are simply suspected to be carrying the virus. Therefore, many people who are
infected do not know it because they are never tested and do not take any precautionary
steps to prevent others from contracting the virus. Pregnancy often hastens the onset of
AIDS in HIV-positive women; i.e., women who are HIV-positive and become pregnant
one or more times will die sooner than those who do not become pregnant. Either way,
fertility falls.
In a study entitled "Fertility and Child Death in Zimbabwe," conducted from August
1998 through May 1999, researchers conducted in-depth interviews of 35 focus groups at
six different sites 46 times. The study found that in Zimbabwe, like many parts of Africa,
childbearing is critical. Children are required to maintain a relationship. Children also
provide security for parents who know that as they age their children will care for them,
especially in countries without governmental social security systems.Most respondents
acknowledged that AIDS greatly affects mortality Most also said that they would have
fewer children because of the perceived child mortality, among other factors.
As more and more adults die due to AIDS, surviving family members take on
responsibility for the children left behind, diminishing the desire for more children
because it is not economically practical. The Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey
(ZDHS) reports that in 1994 the total fertility rate, or the expected total number of
children born to a woman in a lifetime, decreased by 16 percent from 1992 to 4.3 children
per woman.

In 1999, the ZDHS indicated that that the total fertility rate had declined

further to four births per woman. The ZDHS expects that by the year 2025, the total
fertility rate in Zimbabwe will be to be down to 2.0 children.^" The U S. Census Bureau
published total fertility rates by region and country from 1985 to 2025 As a whole, sub-
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Saharan Africa has experienced a decline in the expected number of children born to each
woman. In 1985, 6,5 children were born per woman. By 1998, the average had
decreased to 5 8 children and the Bureau expects that by the year 2025, it will have fallen
to 3.8 children. Each of the six demographic indicators have led to a large-scale
transformation of population structure in the most affected regions of sub-Saharan Africa.
The U.S. Census Bureau illustrates population structure in the form of an age pyramid.
One side of the pyramid represents the number of males in a specific age range and the
other side represents the females in the same age category The base, beginning with the
age group 0-4 years, is the widest in an average population scenario. As the age
categories escalate, the pyramid structure begins to form because each age category
begins to decrease in total number of people due to deaths. By the time the pyramid
reaches the 80 plus range, it has tapered off to a peak. In places most severely affected,
the AIDS epidemic has altered the age pyramid to such a point that it no longer looks like
a pyramid at all. People most likely to reproduce are falling victim to AIDS. The change
skews the pyramid shape. The base of the structure is wide, but because of significant
mortality and lower fertility, it quickly narrows and looks like the stem of a glass. The
structure gradually widens as mortality rates decrease in the older age cohorts. The
expansion resembles the bowl of the glass.
Two significant age ranges are being altered—the child and infant range and the range
of 25-40 year-olds. Those ranges comprise seven of the 17 age categories, which begin
at 0-4 year-olds and increase successively by four-year intervals until age 80. In
Botswana, the age pyramid appeared normal in 2000, but the U.S. Census Bureau
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projects that by the year 2025, the widest age category will be the 20-24 year-olds rather
than the 0-4-age range.
A change in population structure is significant because it correlates to an increase in
the dependency ratio. The epidemic has reduced the proportion of economically active
adults in the 20-40 year-old age range and increased the number of orphans, thereby
increasing the "dependency ratio" of the population. The "age pyramid" has narrowed
significantly in the middle, placing greater burdens on the elderly and the y o u n g . T h e
increase in the dependency ratio is even more prominent when HIV/AIDS-associated
illnesses move infected adults from the economically productive segment of society to
the dependent section of the population. Consequently, aging has been radically changed
in sub-Saharan Africa. AIDS has wiped out age cohorts that children and the elderly are
typically dependent upon, thereby creating a situation where the elderly are responsible
for taking care of their own ill children as well as their grandchildren.
AIDS has affected countries in sub-Saharan Africa at different rates for different
reasons. Implementing and maintaining a national response to the deadly disease has
proven to be critical in preventing its further spread, managing AIDS in those already
infected, and dealing with the effects on those people that are associated with an AIDS
infected patient. AIDS is not a disease that only cripples the infected person; it can also
destroy families, communities, and the economies where it thrives. Strong, effective, and
creative leadership at the highest level of government is necessary for every successful
national AIDS prevention campaign.
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A frican Leadership
In Africa, political leadership has been the critical factor that ensures order or disorder
within the state. In their book. Personal-rule In Black Africa, Prince, Autocrat, Prophet,
Tyrant^ authors Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg assert that, in the provision or the
destruction of such "political goods" as peace, order, stability, and non-material security,
the personal actions of Africa's rulers and other leaders have been more important than
anything else/^ Jackson and Rosberg propose a typology of personal-rule in Africa,
which emphasizes the socio-political aspects of rule. Rosberg and Jackson's typology for
analyzing individual rulers and regimes in Africa raises the question of why different
types of personal-rule emerge where and when they do.^^ It makes explicit the common
features of personal-rule regimes in Africa, without losing sight of the fact that there are
different types of personal-rulers in contemporary Africa.
The central feature of personal-rule is that politics is a dynamic world of political will
and action that is ordered less by institutions than by personal authorities and power, a
world of stratagem and countermeasure, of action and reaction, but without the assured
mediation and regulation of effective political institutions.^^ The study of personal-rule is
an approach that highlights important features of African politics such as clientelism and
patronage, factionalism, coups, purges, plots, succession crisis, and similar characteristics
and dynamics of institutionless government. Jackson and Rosberg place such phenomena
into a framework of theoretical explanation by drawing upon classical political theory
and comparative government theory, and Weber's sociology of authority and the
sociology of clientelism.^^
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Comparative government's analytic tradition, which focuses on political institutions,
their nature, the historical conditions that give rise to them, and their importance for
political life, has directly influenced Rosberg and Jackson's thinking about personalrule/^ They also place emphasis on institutions, their characteristics, the historical
circumstances from which they rise, and their significance in political life. Another
major influence is Weber's sociology of authority For Weber there are two basic sub
types of personal-rule—traditional-personal domination and charismatic domination,
which bear a resemblance to Jackson and Rosberg's concepts of "princely rule" and
"autocratic rule" on the one hand, and "prophetic rule" on the other

Jackson and

Rosberg depart from Weber's definition by not confining their subtypes to legitimate
domination. Rather, they identify a type of personal-rule outside of Weber's theoretical
framework: that is, tyranny
For Rosberg and Jackson, the four types of rulers include: the prince, the autocrat, the
prophet, and the tyrant. The forms of personal-rule are ideal types. The specific
characteristics of particular rulers will not conform exactly to the modalities of the
category to which the leader is assigned.The prince is the type of ruler that is an astute
observer and manipulator of lieutenants and clients. The prince tends to rule jointly with
other oligarchs and to cultivate their loyalty, cooperation, and support. To rule as a
prince is to preside over the struggle for preferments, to encourage it, to recognize that it
is a source of the ruler's and the regime's legitimacy, but not to allow it to get out of
hand.^'
The autocrat is the type of ruler who tends to dominate the oligarchy, the government,
and the state without having to share power with other leaders. Where the prince resides
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and mies, the autocrat commands and manages; the country is his estate. For the
autocrat, the ruling apparatus is ultimately his to deploy and direct, and the party and
governmental officials are his servants and agents. This type of personal-rule is
reminiscent of absolute monarchy The African autocrat faces limitations of his rule, but
they are limitations on resources and organizational capability—not of discretionary
power The relative "underdevelopment" of the ruling apparatus available to him limits
the autocrat's power Other limitations include inadequate finances, personnel,
equipment, technology, material, as well as the underdeveloped skills and abilities of his
officials. Nevertheless, his discretionary power to direct his apparatus, in principle, is
unlimited. Autocracy depends on the fortuitous confluence of circumstance and ability
It depends on the strength of will and ability of the ruler to dominate, as well as the
ruler's ability to confine and largely limit the process of politics to issues completely
within his immediate competence and control. The autocrat is successfial in eliminating
the autonomous political power and influence of others.
Prophetic rulers are visionaries, wanting to reshape society in ways consistent with
their ideology, which, in Africa, is usually socialist. Prophets tend to be impatient with
the social, economic, and political conditions about them, which they see as obstacles to
socialist progress. They seek to eliminate these obstacles, but usually do not possess
adequate political and economic resources to do so. Ideology is not separate from
prophetic rule but essential to it, and contained by it, although in practice it is oAen the
"charisma" of the leader—his charm, mystique, and personality—that counts most in a
prophetic regime. In other words, what really counts is not the ideology the ruler
enunciates, but the fact that the ruler enunciates it. Since ideology and rhetoric can
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inspire but cannot guide, prophets must be concerned with plans and programs for
guiding government.''^
Tyranny is a residual type of personal regime into which any or all of the other types
may deteriorate. In a tyranny not only legal but also all moral constraints on the exercise
of power are absent, with the consequence that power is exercised in a completely
arbitrary fashion according to the impulses of the ruler and his agents. Tyranny is
marked by particularly impulsive, oppressive, and brutal rule that has lacked elementary
respect—and has sometime shown complete disdain—not only for the rights of persons
and property but also for the very sanctity of human life. Tyrants rule through fear and
reward agents and collaborators and make mercenaries of them.'"''
Rosberg and Jackson's typology shows that, in systematic terms, it is not primarily the
ruler as a person that determines the relative stability of a polity

Rule is more about the

leaders's political skills and acumen, or the leader's personal experience and
understanding of the opportunities and constraints that govern personal actions and those
of other leaders, and of the best methods for influencing and controlling other leaders and
the countries. Africa's most successful and enduring rulers have learned from experience
about the resources and limitations of their own political systems.
Jacob Gordon updated Jackson and Rosberg's typology in his hod^ African
Leadership in the Twentieth Century: An Enduring Experiment in Democracy, published
in July 2002. Gordon argues that the key to understanding the idea of African leadership
is to examine the subject as a universal human experience and as African civilization.
Both contexts, the universal and the African, are critical to understanding and
appreciation for the contributions of African leaders to the development of African
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society and world politics.Based on his literature review, Gordon compiled a set of
twelve characteristics that a creative and effective African leader must embody and
achieve. These characteristics go beyond Rosberg and Jackson by expanding on
typology

Three of Gordon's characteristics of creative and effective leadership that I

will employ to compare Mbeki and Museveni's leadership approaches are:
1 ) He knows and understands that bureaucratic hierarchies are dead and advocates
community of responsibility
2) He promotes and initiates change, viewing it as an opportunity for all stakeholders.
3 ) He inspires, motivates, and stimulates leading through personal persuasion and
valuing emotions as well as ideas.
Gordon asserts that the future of African leadership is inextricably linked with the
challenges with which Africa must grapple in the 21^^ century, including health.

The

AIDS epidemic has generated national crises across sub-Saharan Africa. Two countries
that stand out are Uganda and South Africa. Connections between political leadership
and effective approaches to the AIDS epidemic in Uganda and South Africa offer many
compelling comparisons. Taking Gordon's recommendation to examine African
leadership within in the context of leadership literature as a universal human experience
into account, James David Barber's categorization of American presidents also can be
applied in the African context. Barber divides personality types of contemporary
presidents into four categories: 1) active-positive presidents, 2) active-negative
presidents, 3) passive-positive presidents, and 4) passive negative presidents. Both
Museveni and Mbeki are active-positive presidents, which means that they want results,
and push for change in institutions, policies, and procedures. They invest a good deal of
personal energy into the office, and their personal needs and skills translate well into
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political leadership. Active-positive presidents gain personal satisfaction from serving as
chief of state. However, while both men are similar in this sense, they differ in their
approaches.™
This thesis will utilize Rosberg and Jackson's typology and Gordon's extension of it
in exploring whether the leadership approaches of Mbeki and Museveni are likely to have
helped shape the different HIV/AIDS outcomes experienced in Uganda and South Africa.
To assess whether each man's political leadership effectively battled the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in his country, successfully lowering HIV/AIDS prevalence rates, and changed
public attitudes about the disease, I will employ WHOAFRO's 1986 recommendation as
the standard for comparative evaluation.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CASE OF UGANDA

The African AIDS epidemic is a contemporary health crisis of staggering proportions
and one with which African society and governments have signally failed to cope.' A
country that lies within the AIDS Belt that has a unique story is Uganda. Uganda has
been lauded as one of the most successfiil HIV/AIDS prevention cases in Africa. There
has in fact been no change recorded at the national level in Africa except in Uganda,
where HIV infection rates have fallen.^ In Kampala, Uganda's major urban area, HIV
prevalence among antenatal clinic attendees tested increased from 11 percent in 1985 to
25 percent in 1990 and then 29 4 percent in 1992. Beginning in 1993 however, HIV
prevalence among antenatal clinic attendees began to decline in Kampala, reaching 13 8
percent in 1998 and 11.25 percent in 2000. Median HIV prevalence among antenatal
clinic attendees outside of the major urban areas has declined from 13 percent in 1992 to
5.9 percent n 2000. Median prevalence from 12 sites outside Kampala ranged from 1.9
percent to 10 percent.^ While seroprevalence has decreased dramatically, UN AIDS still
classifies Uganda as having a high national adult-prevalence rate.'* The reason a decline
in seroprevalence has taken place and national attitudes about HIV have changed is
believed to be the strong leadership of President Yoweri Museveni since 1986 and his
insistence that AIDS should be discussed and identified as a national crisis needing
action/
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Using Jackson and Rosberg's typology of personal-rule to identify and explain
Museveni and his administration in conjunction with Gordon's characteristics of an
effective and creative African leader will help illustrate why his leadership skills
translated into successful approaches to battle the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda. Their
leadership typology of personal-rule asserts that political institutions are extremely
dependent upon the historical conditions from which they rise. The reason AIDS
established such a stronghold in Uganda can be understood in the context of historical
circumstance and events coupled with political leadership

Overview of Uganda's Recent History
Development of a risk environment and increased susceptibility in Uganda has much
to do with the growth of ethnic, regional, and class differences as Ugandan society came
into existence from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century In
Uganda, these divisions became lines of conflict that tore a recently established polity to
pieces. The development of the epidemic in Uganda since the late 1970s and the
reconstruction of the society in the period since 1986 have gone together ^
Late in the nineteenth century, Europeans artificially created Uganda without respect
to boundaries that divided various ethnic groups. The creation of the state arbitrarily
pulled more than forty ethnic groups together into the same political unit. Uganda was
under British control, and the British were eager to stamp as much of their social-political
culture as they could on Ugandan territory One ethnic group within the territory, the
Buganda, possessed a highly developed monarchical system. Such a centralized
monarchy facilitated the British objective of control over this region of Africa. The
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Buganda became the favored tribe, and for years had the most political and economic
power in Uganda.^
The epicenter of the AIDS epidemic was the region of Buganda. Its colonial history
revolves around the cultivatioft^f cotton and coffee. In 1902, the Uganda railway opened
and linked Mombasa on the Indian Ocean to Kampala and reduced cost of transporting
commodities produced in the African interior Cotton production ensured that Great
Britain's newly acquired territory was self-financing and guaranteed cheap raw materials
for the declining Lancashire cotton industry The British aimed to keep Africans in the
rural areas producing cotton. The British put trade into the hands of Asians imported as
laborers and settlers. By 1938, the Asians that the British imported controlled cotton
ginning, wholesale trade, and commerce. Africans remained in the agricultural sector,
but in an agricultural sector that was undergoing rapid change. ^
Land tenure reform facilitated a wealthy Ganda peasant class. The social and
economic circumstances of colonialism divided society into the traditional aristocracy, an
economic class of independent small holders and rural entrepreneurs, or laborers, and the
Asian ginnery owners, traders and merchants. National movements in the late 1940s
organized political opposition to the status quo. The 1950s saw a succession of violent
incidents and boycotts aimed at Asians, and by the 1960s, the language of political
protest had become a racial one - Africans against Asians, which had very dramatic
results in the next decade.^
In 1962, officials called the London Conference for the purposes of laying
groundwork for an independent Ugandan state. Independence ushered the transfer of
political power to the King of Buganda and his allies in a political party called the UPC.
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Milton Obote, the leader of that party, was named Prime Minister The transition of
power from colonial to independent rule was not easy The government inherited an
extensive bureaucracy that the British created, but had a great deal of difficulty managing
it eflfectively The economy suffered through skyrocketing inflation.
Corruption in government and the private sector threatened to overwhelm the
economy As a result, internal dissension and resistance to the government increased,
and political instability amplified. Obote tried to maintain power by becoming
increasingly autocratic. The strategy only alienated him more, and in 1966, as political
struggles mounted, the alliance between the monarchy and his party fell apart. Obote
abrogated the 1962 constitution that recognized the monarchy and forced the King into
exile in London. Under increasing pressure, and with the economy sliding, Obote
increased his strongman tactics to maintain power His action ultimately led to a coup in
1971 when Idi Amin led a successful overthrow of Obote and his government . ' ^ His new
military government was initially welcomed by disaffected opponents of the Obote
regime, as well as by foreign investors and Western countries who saw it as putting an
end to Obote's experiments with socialism, which had been threatening to foreign
investors who had sizable holdings in Uganda.'^
The 1970s were years of destabilization with loss of security for life and property
Between 1971 and 1979, Amin and his regime subjected Uganda to one of the most
capricious, terror-ridden, and inhumane governments yet to emerge in sub-Saharan
Africa.

Tyranny in Uganda arose in an historical context of government coercion and

political violence, on the one hand, and inequity among groups, especially in their access
to government controlled privileges and opportunities, on the other
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The invasion of the

country in 1972 by Ugandan forces based in Tanzania set off widespread tribal killing as
Amin sought to eliminate all opposition inside the country

Economic mismanagement

and terror characterized the Amin period Where Obote had imprisoned opponents, Amin
had them physically eliminated; instead of harassing ethnic groups he distrusted, Amin
simply massacred them.

This is important for understanding the creation of a risk

environment.
The key was magendo, a LuGanda word meaning "pilgramage of greed." Mageiido
developed as a system of illicit, semi-legal, and illegal distribution after Amin finally
expelled all the Asians in August 1972, and destroyed existing systems of distribution.
Amin's economic policies Iroze agriculture prices and drew large quantities of cash crops
into the black market.

The essence of the magendo economy was smuggling coffee,

paraffin, sugar, and gold out of the country, of vehicle spares and other necessities into
the country, and food within the country Illicit markets, secretive transport, and the
human interactions that tied such a system together were a risk environment par
excellence and fertile ground for the development of an epidemic of HIV/AIDS.'^
Conditions here created an environment that raised the potential for effective
transmission of sexually transmitted infection. The conditions were all associated with
illicit trade and survival in times of extreme disruption. The conditions included high
mean rates of sexual partner change, high mixing of partners across geographical areas,
large numbers of concurrent partnerships, and geographical mobility Gender relations
rooted in local tradition and disrupted by disorder increased the levels of individual and
social susceptibility to HIV
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Survival strategies in times of hardship created demand for the provision of food,
lodging, and sex at truck-stop townships, border towns, and the smuggling villages on
Lake Victoria. The magendo economy inflated men's cash incomes compared to those of
women. This increased women's insecurity and dependence. Such circumstances threw
already unequal gender relations flirther imbalance, an imbalance that inevitably took on
a sexual complexion.^' Buganda, and within it Rakai District, the focal point of
Uganda's HIV/AIDS epidemic, is adjacent to the lorry route from Mombasa in Kenya to
Bujumbura in Burundi. It fronts Lake Victoria and has many casting off points for
journeys to Kenya and Tanzania. When the Tanzanian army overthrew Amin in 1979, it
is where the invading army passed and spent several months in 1979-1980.^^
The omnipresence of military interfered with nearly everyone and increased existing
insecurity The health care delivery system collapsed, and peasant farmers bore the brunt
of the impact. Social welfare services disappeared as qualified people by the hundreds
left the country, and the government filled the vacancies with mediocre, incompetent
political appointees, thus ensuring total institutional collapse in the country

Instead of

national reconciliation in the months immediately after Amin, Uganda suffered persistent
and widespread criminal lawlessness, which seriously undermined personal security and
delayed reconstruction. In addition, factional conflicts and rivalries grounded not only in
personal differences among leaders, but also in underlying ideological and ethnic
divisions, exacerbated attempts to reestablish effective and orderly government.^'* Once
again, Uganda came under the rule of Milton Obote, installed by the Tanzanians, and
decay of the state structure continued.
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Obote's regime did not allow normality to reappear in people's lives. The illicit
economy continued to thrive as a vital part of people's survival strategies. In 1986,
Yoweri Museveni defeated and expelled Obote and took office as president of Uganda.
Museveni took office determined to reintegrate his collapsed state and set in on a course
to political stability and economic development.^^ Museveni's government rapidly
estabUshed a higher level of civil and political order in most of the country To restore
government, he chose a "movement system." Instead of parties, the country would have
one all-inclusive movement, thus eliminating opposition. It was a concept of direct rather
than representative democracy that could easily play into the hands of the only organized
forces, the movement and the government.^'
However, Uganda remained a troubled society for the next decade, and armed
opposition groups remain active in parts of the country In addition, Uganda's army is
prominently involved in the Great African War in the Congo between forces from
Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and Rwanda, as well as various Congolese
factions and warlords. All of this, including the migration patterns and lifestyles of
soldiers and others involved in or affected by the war, contributes to even greater
population movement across this huge region spanning millions of square kilometers,
creating a risk environment and facilitating the further spread and transmission of HIV

History of HIV/AIDS in Uganda
Doctors documented the first cases of AIDS in the Rakai District of southwest Uganda
in 1982.^^ Between 1982 and 1986, the health sector largely handled the epidemic with
spontaneous community initiatives to care for the infected and affected. The above
historical survey of Uganda illustrates how change and fluidity in social, economic, and
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political relationships create circumstances where HIV could lodge and spread rapidly
Susceptibility takes many forms. In this case, it is rooted in changes in structures of
power, between ethnic groups, classes, genders, and political actors
In 1986, not long after his guerrilla force seized power in Uganda, Yoweri Museveni
sent 60 officers from the bush army to Cuba for training. Several months later Fidel
Castro, Cuba's president, approached Museveni at a conference in Zimbabwe with a
staggering bit of news; medical exams in Cuba had revealed that 18 of the 60 officers
were HIV-positive, Years of war, displacement, pillage, and rape had entrenched HIV in
Uganda as early as the late 1970s. Museveni took Castro's warning that he "had a
problem" to heart, realizing that AIDS is potentially destabilizing and increases the
likelihood of a military coup

The new president quickly made HIV/AIDS a top

priority Within one year, he was leading a nationwide mobilization against AIDS that
drew in bishops, imams, and public health experts, as well as thousands of small
community groups nationwide. The program would become known as ABC, for
"Abstain, Be Faithfiil, or wear a condom"— in order of emphasis.

Magnitude of HIV/AIDS in Uganda
Doctors documented clinically defined cases of AIDS throughout Uganda in 1988.^^
Sentinel survey results in 1987 revealed that an estimated 33 percent of long-distance
truck-drivers in Uganda were HIV positive. The number of reported AIDS cases in
Uganda increased from 17 in 1983 to more than 7,500 in early 1990

In 1988, scientists

sampled the blood of 11,000 people and found that one in 16 was HIV positive.^^ In
January 1990, Ugandan health officials reported cumulative totals to the World Health
Organization, which determined that Uganda's national HIV adult-prevalence rate stood
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at 11 4 percent. By June 1991, they estimated that 1.5 million Ugandans were infected
with HIV In urban hospitals, patients with AIDS related infections occupied up to forty
percent of the beds. ^^ In 1994, scientists estimated that one in six Ugandans was HIV
positive.^^
In its annual Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic, published in June 2000,
UN AIDS estimated that Uganda had brought its estimated prevalence rate down to
around 8 percent from a peak close to 14 percent in the early 1990s. The report credits
the decline to strong prevention campaigns, which resulted from Uganda's government,
under President Museveni, recognizing the danger of HIV and taking steps to fight its
spread through action by the government and other groups in society

By 2000, HIV

prevalence rates in pregnant women in urban areas fell to 11.25 percent from a high of
29 5 percent in 1992 . ^^ Uganda continues to present proof that the epidemic does yield to
human intervention. Recent HIV infections appear to be on the decline in several parts of
the country, as shown by the steady drop in HIV prevalence among 15-19 year-old
pregnant women.

40

Political Leadership in Uganda
President Yoweri Museveni has gained international acclaim for having elevated
HIV/AIDS to a national priority Infection rates are decreasing."" Uganda has
successfully brought down HIV/AIDS prevalence from more than 30 percent in the 1980s
and the early 1990s to the current rate of about 6 percent.'*^ Through autocratic rule,
Museveni developed a creative leadership strategy that fulfills Gordon's guidelines for
effective and creative leadership and follows the 1986 WHOAFRO recommendation.'*^
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Type of Personal-Rule
Jackson and Rosberg hold that it is crucial to consider the crucial role played by
political leaders and their actions on the public life of states in contemporary Africa.
Personal-rule has been evident in Uganda since it gained independence in 1962. Jackson
and Rosberg categorized Idi Amin as a tyrant and effectively illustrated how his actions
played a tremendous role in the development of Uganda following independenceThe
system of personal-rule has continued under President Museveni, who came to power in
1986 and restored political stability
Museveni is an autocratic leader as defined by Rosberg and Jackson. He is a ruler that
tends to control the oligarchy, the government, and the state without having to share
power with other leaders. Museveni effectively guaranteed that the ruling apparatus is
uhimately his to deploy and direct, and the party and governmental officials are his
servants and agents. He ensured the absence of strong opposition by utilizing a
movement system instead of parties and implementing a decentralized system of local
government. Museveni only allowed the direct election of village councils. Members of
lower bodies elect four other layers of councils indirectly The layers culminate with
district councils, which emerged as the most important unit of local government, and are
far removed from voters' control. The drafting of a new constitution also became an
exercise in limited participation."^^
A constitutional commission held hundreds of meetings throughout the country,
soliciting oral and written comments. As in elections, individuals could not participate as
members of organizations. It was a concept of direct rather than representative
democracy that could easily play into the hands of the only organized forces, the
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movement and the government, both of which Museveni was in charge/^ What
restrictions Museveni has on his rule are the limitations of resources and organizational
capability—not of limited control

Creative and Effective Leadership
Uganda became the first African country to acknowledge the seriousness of the AIDS
epidemic due to Museveni's leadership/*^ In his approach to battle the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in Uganda, Museveni embodies each of the three characteristics, drawn from
Gordon's set, which a creative and effective African leader must embody and achieve.
The first characteristic is acknowledging and understanding that bureaucratic hierarchies
are dead and advocating a community of responsibility The second characteristic of
creative and effective leadership, promoting and initiating change and viewing it as an
opportunity for all stakeholders, is inextricably interrelated with the first.
Just after taking power. President Museveni vowed to focus his efforts on fighting the
disease and promptly made it a national priority Early in his administration, Museveni
mobilized a wide spectrum of groups.

The government engaged religious and

traditional leaders in an intensive coordinated campaign to educate the population.
Officials brought active prevention programs focused on delaying sexual relations and
negotiating safe behavior into schools.^' Uganda has invested heavily in training health
workers, creating counseling networks, treating sexually transmitted diseases, and
expanding HIV testing. President Museveni's administration established The Ugandan
National Task Force on AIDS in 1990. One year later, a multi-sectored program began,
which involved condom distribution and promotion through popular songs, drama
groups, counseling, and support services.
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In 1995, a nationwide promotion campaign initiated more approaches to promote safe
sex, abstinence, fewer sex partners, and condom use among young people. The Sexuality
Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS) reported in its Policy
Update for March 2002, that President Museveni stated, "We encouraged community
based initiatives and our campaign has produced a lot of mass networks. We encouraged
condom use, and in ten years have seen it go up from seven percent to forty-two
percent.

In addition to a decrease in HIV/AIDS, there has been a subsequent rise in

the age of first sexual intercourse, and in monogamy The percentage of pregnant women
with HIV has dropped since 1991 The use of condoms has increased substantially
among young people.
The third characteristic of creative and effective leadership is inspiring, motivating,
and stimulating, leading through personal persuasion, valuing emotions as well as ideas.
Museveni approached the AIDS epidemic in Uganda through word and action. Museveni
recognized early on that the personal involvement of the head of state was key to
implementing AIDS prevention and education programs.'^ Speaking to African leaders
at the African Development Forum in December 2000, in Addis Abba, Museveni stated:
When a lion comes to the village, you don't make a small alarm. You make a very
loud one. When I knew of this problem I said we must shout and shout and shout and
shout
When we started, our Ministry of Health were putting out a small
advertisement after TV news
But in 1986 we only had 100,000 television sets.
How many people would hear about it? I told them . . this alarm of yours is a silent
alarm. The best channel for making a loud alarm are the political leaders . . . WTien a
district health officer comes to address a meeting, twenty people turn up. But if
Museveni is coming to address a rally, nearly 20,000 people turn up. That is the time
to pass the message. Talk about your politics, but talk about AIDS also . . You
cannot just leave it to the bureaucrats. They will just put AIDS messages when
people are going to work and say "we've put it there." They don't care. So the
leadership must supervise this war
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WHO's 1986 Recommendation for a Plan of Action in the African Region
The recommendation for a plan of action in the African region of WHO, drawn up in
March 1986, consisted of 1) initial assessment at the national level, 2) the strengthening
of health infrastructure in order to support epidemiological, laboratory, clinical and
prevention activities, educational and informational programs to the general public, risk
groups, and health care workers, and 3) the exchange of information, including reporting
of AIDS cases. At the same time the WHO AFRO meeting was taking place, Uganda was
ushering in a new president. Devastated by years of dictatorship and war, Uganda has
been ravaged by one of the highest prevalence rates in Africa.

Today, those

recommendations have become a reality in Uganda. Museveni's prompt
acknowledgment of the severity of the problem through speech and action has led to the
ascertainment of the characteristics of effective creative leadership and has led to the
decrease of national HIV/AIDS prevalence in Uganda.
HIV seroprevalence is known at the national and regional level, and is published
annually in the AIDS Epidemic Update by UN AIDS and WHO Primary modes of
transmission have been traced and documented.

Uganda went from being one of the

most infected countries in the world to the best prevention case in Africa through action.
In 1986, Uganda's Health Minister of the new government announced the existence of
HIV/AIDS in Uganda during the World Health Assembly in Geneva, marking the
beginning of openness about the epidemic that created an environment conducive for
mass campaigns spearheaded by President Museveni. In the same year, the first
government-structured effort to address the epidemic occurred when the government
established the first National AIDS Control Program (NACP) in the Ministry of Health.
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Its priority was focusing on safe blood, prevention of HIV infection in health care
settings, information, education, and communication. The government charged the
NACP with coordination between and within other departments of government, meaning
that HIV/AIDS was and continued to be seen as a medical problem. Other bodies, both
within and outside government, felt that HIV/AIDS was not their concern or
responsibility ^
The next year, the government established an AIDS Control Program in the Ministry
of Defense to respond to the special need in the armed forces. By 1988, the government
conducted a national serosurvey to assess the magnitude of the epidemic among the adult
population. The average prevalence rate was already nine percent. The government
conducted consultations on the multisectoral approach to control. The consultations
helped the government understand that the impact of the epidemic went beyond the
health sector, which lead to the recognition of the need to plan and implement relevant
activities. In 1987, the government established The AIDS Support Organization (TASO)
to provide psychological support for the infected and affected.^'
The government, in conjunction with NGOs and other institutions in civil society, was
determined to deal with the issues openly and directly, and to place Uganda at the
forefront of the fight against HIV/AIDS. This ensured not only that Uganda has one of
the most vigorous and wide-ranging programs to combat the epidemic, but also that it
began to develop consistent systems of monitoring, as suggested in the 1986 WHOAFRO
recommendation. The results are a clear example of what can be achieved even in a
country with few resources and poor infrastructure.^^
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In November 1990, a team of United States demographers showed the president a
glossy video in which they used a mathematical model of the epidemic to project the
potentially devastating impact of HIV/AIDS on the population of his country Impressive
graphics informed the president that if there were no HIV/AIDS, by the year 2015 there
could be 32 million Ugandans. However, if the dramatic AIDS epidemic continued, the
population would be only 20 million people plus the added burden of 5-6 million orphans
resulting from the death of AIDS victims. Soon after seeing the film, the president
announced that the AIDS epidemic was now "beyond the control of the medical experts"
and that Uganda needed "a massive campaign to educate people to change their sexual
behavior

The following June, Museveni set a precedent by opening the annual

International Conference on AIDS in Florence, a clear indication of the importance
accorded HIV/AIDS by the political leader ^ While there, Museveni said AIDS was "not
only a health problem but is a social, economic, and political nightmare.
In 1990, the government charged a task force on AIDS with developing a
multisectoral response to AIDS control. Participants included all government ministries,
local and international NGOs, and the major international agencies. The process had
strong support from President Museveni. It resulted in the establishment of the 24member Uganda AIDS Commission. The task force on AIDS required the Commission
to oversee, plan, and coordinate AIDS control programs, and be a reference point for the
formulation of plans, policies, and national guidelines for HIV/AIDS control programs
and activities.
The innovative Ugandan response encouraged active participation of everyone in
reducing transmission and spread of HIV/AIDS, provided strategies for prevention and
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impact mitigation, and advocated for capacity building at the community, sub-national
and national levels. This definition turned away from exclusively medical models of
response, included epidemic consequences, and recognized that all sectors and levels of
Ugandan society had to be involved. Over several years, agencies and participating
organizations identified a portfolio of more than fifty interventions.''^
In 1990, the government formed the AIDS Information (AIC) for voluntary testing
and counseling services, and formally adopted the Multisectoral Approach to the Control
of AIDS (MACA) adopted in 1992, as a poHcy and strategy for responding to the
epidemic. The peak of infections in hard-hit areas occurred that year, with some urban
sites registering a prevalence rate of more than 30 percent.*'^ In the same year, an Act of
Parliament established the Uganda AIDS Commission to coordinate the multisectoral
eflforts to unify the response.This National Policy and Strategy is based on the fact that
HIV/AIDS affects all strata of the population, and poses a serious threat to the socio
economic life and development of the country The MACA created an atmosphere of
openness and effective political commitment to HIV/AIDS control, which has created
high levels of awareness in the population about the dangers of the epidemic, and
possible means of prevention. It served as a basis for the development of the first
National Program, the National Operational Plan for HIV/AIDS/STD Prevention, Care
and Support 1994-1998, ad the consequent national programs. The establishment of
AIDS Control Programs (ACPs) outside the health sector, in twelve line Ministries, in
1995 further strengthened the multisectoral response to the epidemic.™
The UAC led and coordinated the development of the first multisectoral National
Operational Plan (NOP) for HIV/AIDS/STD activities from 1994 to 1998. The NOP
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reflected the primary needs, and represented the sectors that took the lead in addressing
the epidemic. In 1994 and 1995, the government established more AIDS Control
Program Units in the Ministries of Gender, Education, Agriculture, Internal Affairs
(Police and Prisons), Justice, Finance, PubHc Service and Local Government. In 1994,
the government borrowed US$75 million in a soft loan from the World Bank, executed
by the Ministry of Health through the Sexually Transmitted Infections Project (STIP)
1995-2000, to fight the epidemic. In 1995, Uganda successfully hosted and organized the
International Conference on AIDS and STDs in Africa (ICASA), and announced the
observance of declining trends in HIV prevalence. In 1996, Uganda received the first
UNAIDS Country Program Adviser (CPA), and began vaccine trials after thorough
consultations with all key stakeholders.^'
A comprehensive review of HIV/AIDS activities in Uganda was conducted by
development partners, supported by UNAIDS, including the UN AIDS Secretariat and its
cosponsors particularly UNDP, WHO, UNICEF, World Bank, UNFPA, USAID,
European Union, DFID, DANIDA, SIDA, and the Italian, German, and French
governments among others, to assess coordination and implementation of HIV/AIDS
activities in 1997.^^ In the same year, the 1998-2002 National Strategic Framework
(NSF) for HIV/AIDS Activities with consensus from partners from various sectors at
national and district levels was developed, and initial research on the District Response
Initiative (DRI) in the Kabarole district occurred. The DRI concept and framework has
since been developed and agreed on by partners, and implementation began in 2001
In the mid-1990s, the national per capita spending on health was a little over $5,50
With no cure available, the only available weapon was information and efforts. For many
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Ugandans, life would be forever changed by the governmental efforts to help prevent
AIDS transmission/^ In 1998, the government established the Drug Access Initiative to
advocate for reduced prices for anti-retroviral drugs, and to support the establishment of
proper infrastructure for administering these drugs/^

Comiections Between Political Leadership and Effective Approaches to the AIDS
Epidemic in Uganda
Uganda's government has met the terms of the WHO recommendation, and adult
HIV prevalence rates have continued to decrease. Jackson and Rosberg's typology of
personal-rule in conjunction with Gordon's characteristics of creative and effective
leadership demonstrate how Museveni's determination transformed into effective action,
and explain why his leadership skills have led to successful approaches to battle the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in his country
HIV prevalence continues to fall in Uganda, and public attitudes about the disease
have gradually changed. By acknowledging the problem and implementing important
suggestions asserted in the 1986 WHO AFRO recommendation, Museveni has been able
curb the spread of HIV/AIDS. The average national prevalence rates among the adult
population have declined from approximately 18.5 percent in 1995, to 14 7 percent in
1997, 9.5 percent in 1998, to 8.3 percent at the end of 1999

With comprehensive HIV

prevention efforts that reach down to village levels, Uganda's response to AIDS has
boosted condom use across the country Frank messages and discussions on hitherto
repressed subjects, put sexuality, sexual practices, and STDs on the agenda in ways never
before known to most of the population. A major focus of much AIDS education was the
introduction and use of condoms.In 1990, the majority of Ugandans professed to shun
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the condom, which they thought to be non-African or foreign. By 1997, the situation had
changed considerably Survey after survey showed high levels of knowledge about
condoms, and moderate levels of usage. In October 1996, the STD/AIDS Control
Program published its report on declining trends in HIV infection rates in parts of the
country

In the Masindi and Pallisa districts for example, condom use with casual

partners rose from 42 percent and 31 percent, respectively, in 1997, to 51 percent and 53
percent in 2000. In the capital, almost 98 percent of sex workers surveyed in 2000 said
they had used a condom the last time they had sex. The impact of condom use on the
incidence of HIV infection in prostitutes has been well documented in Kenosha and
Nairobi, and condom promotion, where successful, has slowed the spread of HIV
Recent studies from Uganda show a decline in HIV seroprevalence rates, particularly
among young adults. Among young adults in the Makasa district, overall HIV
seroprevalence declined by less than one percentage point between 1989 and 1994, from
8.2 percent to 7.6 percent. However, the decline was greater among the young — from
3 4 percent to 1 percent among males, and from 9.9 percent to 7.3 percent among females
ages 13 to 24. The greatest declines were seen between males ages 20-24 and females
ages 13-19, with a decline from 23.4 percent in 1990 to 20.9 percent in 1992, and a
decline from 17.3 percent to 12.6 percent respectively
HIV prevalence also declined among pregnant women attending antenatal clinics in
Uganda. In the main referral hospital in Kampala, HIV seroprevalence among pregnant
women fell from 28 percent to 16 percent between 1989 and 1993 All age groups under
age 38 experienced a decline in prevalence. The decline was greatest for those under 19
Between 1991 and 1994, officials observed similar declines among pregnant women at

42

antenatal clinics in other urban areas of Uganda. Since 1993, prevalence rates have fallen
to fifteen percent among antenatal women in Kampala.
According to nationwide surveys conducted in 1989 and 1995, there have been
important changes in sexual behavior that could explain the apparent decline in incidence
of HIV among young adults observed in antenatal clinics, particularly in urban areas.
The percentage of young adults ages 15 to 19 who have ever had sexual intercourse
declined from 69 percent to 44 percent among men, and from 74 percent to 54 percent
among women. Condom use has risen substantially among all age groups, and the
percentage with a casual partner has declined, particularly among the young.
The Uganda AIDS Commission (UAC) is planning a project worth about US$
350,000 to educate leaders at all levels on how to mobilize people and plan activities
against HIV/AIDS. The project will target political leaders including ministers, members
of parliament, councilors, administrators and religious leaders. The Leadership
Mobilization Strategy will begin mid-2003 if funding is secured. Political leadership at
all levels within and outside government is crucial for success in the fight against
HIV/AIDS.^^ Uganda has been successful in preventing the spread of HIV in many
ways. Other governments can learn meaningful lessons from the way that the Ugandan
government and other institutions have tackled the disease.

43

' John C. Caldwell, "Rethinking the African AIDS Epidemic," Population and Development Review 26,
no. 1 (March 2000): 117
^I. O. Orubuloye, John C. Caldwell, Pat Caldwell, and Shail Jain eds.. The Third World AIDS Epidemic
(Cabera:Australian National University, 1995), 27-33.
^Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)/World Health Organization (WHO),
Epidemiological Fact Sheet (Geneva: UN AIDS, December, 2002), 1.
"Ibid.
'Caldwell, "Rethinking the African AIDS Epidemic," 130.
"^Tony Barnett and Alan Whiteside,
/« the Twenty-First Century (Great Britain: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2002), 131.
Bamidele A. Ojo, Contemporary African Politics: A Comparative Study of Political Transition to
Democratic Legitimacy (Lanham: University Press of America, 1999). 89.
^Bamett and Whiteside, AIDS in the Twenty-First Century, 131-132.
'Ibid., 132.
'®Ojo, Contemporary African Politics. 89
"Ibid.
'^Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal-Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat. Prophet,
Tyrant (Berkeley University of California Press, 1982), 254
'^Philip W Setel, Milton Lewis, and Maryinez Lyons eds.. Histories of Sexually Transmitted Diseases
and HIV/AIDS in Suh-Saharan Africa (WestpoTt, Greenwood Press, 1999), 109.
'''Jackson and Rosberg, Personal-Rule in Black Africa, 259
'^Ojo, Contemporary African Politics, 132.
"'Lutakome A. Kayiira and Edward Kannyo, "Politics and Violence in Uganda," Africa Report 23. no. 1
(January/February. 1978): 42.
' Barnett and Whiteside. AIDS in the Twenty-First Century, 133.
•'Ibid.
"ibid.
--Ibid.
^'Ibid., 135
""Ibid., 134-135.
^Setel, Lewis, and Lyons, Histories, 109.
"^Jackson and Rosberg, Personal-Rule in Black Africa, 264.
'^Barnett and Whiteside, AIDS in the Twenty-First Century, 134.
^^Marina Ottaway, "Africa's "New Leaders" African Solution or African Problem?" Middle East
Repartis, no. 2 (Fall, 1998).
" Marina Ottaway, "Africa's "New Leaders."
"^Barnett and Whiteside, AIDS in the Twenty-First Century, 134.
"'Ibid., 115.

"%id.
Gregory Pappas, "Coming to Terms (At Last) with HIV/AIDS," Gay and Lesbian Review 8, no. 5
(Sept/Oct 2001): 45.
^"Arthur Allen, "Sex Change," The New Republic, 27 May 2002, 14.
^^Bamett and Whiteside, AIDS in the Twenty-First Century, 115.
^"Gaiy W Shannon, Gerald F Pyle, and Rashid L. Bashur, The Geography of AIDS: Origins and
Course of an Epidemic (New York; Guilford Press, 1991), 70.
^^Timothy C. Morgan, "The War Against HIV," Christianity Today, 4 April 1994, 70.
'''Setel, Lewis, and Lyons, Histories, III.
' Morgan, "War Against HIV," 70.
^^Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)/World Health Organization (WHO),
Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic (Geneva: UNAIDS, June, 2000), 9.
''Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)/World Health Organization (WHO), AIDS
Epidemic Update (Geneva: UNAIDS, December, 2001), 17
"'"Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)/World Health Organization (WHO), AIDS
Epidemic Update (Geneva: UNAIDS, December, 2002), 17
Pappas, "Uganda: Coming to Terms," 45.

44

^^Xinhua News Agency, "Political Commitment Important to Curb AIDS: Ugandan President," (Januar\'
19, 2002); 1008019h3013
''"Jacob U. Gordon, African Leadership in the Twentieth Century: An Enduring Experiment in
Democracy (Lanham: University Press of America, 2002), 171.
^"jackson and Rosberg, Personal-Rule in Black Africa, 252-265.
''^Marina Ottaway, "Africa's "New Leaders."

'"Ibid.. 200
''Ibid.
'^Jackson and Rosberg, Personal-Rule in Black Africa, 78.
'^Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS). Policy Update (March
2002).
^"^arN' Caron. "The Politics of Life and Death: Global responses to HIV and AIDS," World Watch 12.
no. 13 (May/June 1999): 35.
'Marguerite L. Daniel, "The Demographic Impact of HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa," Geography
85. no. 1 (January 2000): 48.
'"SIECUS. Policy Update. March 2002.
''Ibid.
-''Ibid.
'^Gumisai Mutume. "African Leaders Declare War on AIDS," Africa Recovery 14, no. 4 (January'
2001): 21.

''Ibid.
' Peter Piot, "Signs of Hope As Poor Nations Show New Will to Fight AIDS, Increased Funding is
Vital," The Missoulian, 8 July 2002, B4.
-^Lieve Fransen and Alan Whiteside, Considering HIV/AIDS in Development Assistance: A Toolkit
(London. Commission of the European Communities. 1999).
'^Uganda AIDS Commission, wivw.aidsuganda.org/hiv/aids.htm accessed on November 15. 2002.
'^'^arnett and Whiteside, AIDS in the Twenty-First Century, 322.
Uganda AIDS Commission Secretariat, Twenty Years of HIV/AIDS in the World. Evolution of the
Epidemic and Response in Uganda (Kampala: Uganda AIDS Commission, June, 2001). 2-3
'"Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). A Measure of Success in Uganda. The
Value of Monitoring Both HIV Prevalence and Sexual Behavior (Geneva: UN AIDS, 1998), 1.
Switzerland, 1998): 1.
®Setel. Lewis, and Lyons, Histories, 111.
''ibid.
'^Yoweri Museveni, "AIDS and Its Impact on the Health and Social Service Infrastructure in
Developing Countries," International Coiiference on HIV/AIDS, Florence, Italy, June 16, 1991.
"Bamett and Whiteside, AIDS in the Twenty-First Century, 323
"Ibid.
'^Uganda AIDS Commission Secretariat. Twenty Years. 2.
®Ibid., 4.
^Uganda AIDS Commission, www.aidsuganda.org/hiv/aids.htm accessed on November 15, 2002.
'Uganda AIDS Commission Secretariat. Twenty Years. 5.
"Ibid.

^'Ibid.
'Setel, Lewis, and Lyons, Histories, 112.
^Uganda AIDS Commission Secretariat, Twenty Years. 6.
''Ibid., 2.
"Setel, Lewis, and Lyons, Histories, 112.
™Ibid.
'^Wax Essex ef a/., eds., AIDS In Africa, 2ded. (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2002), 211.
^"World Bank, Confronting AIDS: Public Priorities in a Global Epidemic, (Oxford University Press,
New York, 1999), 92.
®'lbid.
^^US Bureau of the Census, Report WP/98-2, HIV/AIDS in the Developing World, (US Government
Printing Office, Washington, D C., 1999): 18.

45

^^Xinhua News Agency, "Uganda Plans AIDS-Fighting Mobilization," (April 19, 2001): 1008019h3013.

46

CHAPTER 3
THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa has not united in what former president Nelson Mandela has called "the
new struggle" against AIDS under President Thabo Mbeki, Using Jackson and Rosberg's
typology of personal-rule to identify and explain Mbeki and his administration in
conjunction with Gordon's characteristics of an effective and creative African leader will
help illustrate why his leadership skills did not translate into successfial approaches to
battle the HIV/AIDS epidemic in his country Jackson and Rosberg emphasize that
political institutions are shaped by the circumstance from which arise. President Mbeki's
recent controversial stance on alternative AIDS theories and his plea for an "African
solution" to the problem can be understood only by knowing the history of South Africa
and background of AIDS in the country

Brief History of South Africa
South Africa, together with the uplands of central and east Africa, provided a home
for the earliest known forms of man and his pre-human relatives.' All of South Africa's
people, including the three most populated groups, relied heavily on the land to ensure
life. South Africa's most ancient peoples are the San, who were originally foragers,
organized in small communities made up of a few hundred members at most. The San
resided primarily in the northwestern region of Southern Africa, near the Kalahari Desert.
When the San established contact with other peoples they commonly entered into trading
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relationships with them and appear to have adopted new food-producing methods from
other peoples with whom they met. Some San communities eventually adopted
pastoralism.
The most prominent group is the Khoi-Khoi, who occupied much of Southern Africa
south and east of the San populations to the Orange and Vaal Rivers. The Khoi were
organized politically into chiefdoms, which were considerably larger that the San hunting
bands, but generally consisted of no more than one or two thousand members/ The
Nguni lived along the coastal land between the Drakensberg and the Indian Ocean.^ The
eastern coastlands on which the Nguni settled are the best-watered areas in South Africa
and also have some of the most fertile soil, which encouraged their population to grow
faster and spread further south that other groups."*
The Cape of Good Hope, which lays on the Southern most tip of Africa, first became
known to Europe as a result of the exploring voyages undertaken by the Portuguese in the
search for a sea route to India when Bartholomew Dias rounded the Cape in 1487 ^
English and Dutch vessels on the way to and from the Indies came to use the Cape as a
regular watering place in the early seventeenth century The directorate of the Dutch East
India Company decided the Cape was a favorable refreshment station and on April 6,
1652, Jan van Riebeek arrived with three vessels to set up the new post.^ The Dutch East
India Company intended the enterprise to be a limited one.
The original settlement was tiny and made up exclusively of the Company's servants.
However, because farming undertaken by the Company's full-time employees proved
inefficient and expensive, van Riebeek suggested that a number of settlers establish farms
of their own where they would grow crops and supply the Company's needs for their
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profit. In April 1657, twelve free burghers (settlers) settled on small farms along the
Liesbeek River The number of free burghers steadily grew over the years and a
community of permanent settlers expanded beyond the original fort and took hold in the
tip of Southern Africa/
The Cape acquired the first substantial batch of slaves in 1658 from the Dutch East
Indies and eastern Africa. By 1660, slaves outnumbered the freemen.^ In 1717, the
Cape's Council of Policy adopted the free importation of slaves as official policy The
continued importation of slaves and the expansion of the non white labor force, available
to the white settlers prevented the development of a white laboring class, which led first
to an increasing view that menial labor was beneath the dignity of a white man and to a
pattern of class distinction which corresponded closely to differences of color ^ The
white population often exploited and mistreated blacks and other non-whites, setting the
way for future generations. Perceptions of white racial superiority were apparent from
the earliest colonial encounters of the Dutch settlers with Khoi-Khoi pastoralists at the
Cape.

The growth of the labor force also made possible the expansion of farming

enterprises; differences among the colonists increased accordingly, and towns
expanded."
As areas nearer the Cape filled up with settlers, traders continued to open up the
interior, and farmers followed.

Most settlers moved eastward along the line of greatest

rainfall and took up cattle and sheep raising in the veld, which required large areas of
land because of the relatively dry conditions of the land. With each ranching family
occupying at least one farm of 2500 hecta acres (ha), and with a high rate of natural
increase among the white population, the frontiers of settlement expanded very rapidly.
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absorbing part of the indigenous population as farm servants and driving the rest further
into the hinterland/^ This process, which got underway in the late seventeenth century
and in the eighteenth century, was to continue through most of the nineteenth century
The expansion of the frontier depended on the development of the economy of the settled
areas, which in turn depended on the fortunes of the Company and of the economy of
Europe in general.
The fact that Khoi and San occupied the immediate hinterland of the Cape made the
rapid expansion of the colony easier The relatively sparse population of these peoples
could offer only limited resistance to white expansion in its early stages. The presence of
the Khoi, moreover, meant the possibility of acquiring stock and labor relatively cheaply,
without which such rapid expansion would have been impossible. Khoi groups generally
adopted a friendly attitude to the first whites they met, seeing them as a source of
valuable trade goods. As they began to realize what was happening, Khoi attitudes
changed. However, due to limited population size and the division of their group into
many different chiefdoms, Khoi resistance proved largely ineffective.'^
In 1814, Britain took permanent control of the Cape as a result of the Napoleonic
wars."' At the Cape, by the late eighteenth century, race and class had overlapped for so
long that to many Europeans this social structure appeared to be natural or God given.
There, more hesitant colonial expansion marked the first half of the nineteenth century
than before.
The British administration focused on attempting to make the colony pay its own way
rather than expanding its boundaries. Britain abolished slavery in South Africa in 1834
At the same time, the focus of the economy shifted away from the arable western areas.
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This transformed the Cape from the 1830s, leading to the emergence of a capitalizing
farmer gentry, the increasing value of land, and the extrusion of labor tenants.'^ These
developments led to the migration out of the colony of about 15,000 eastern Cape
pastoralists in the 1830s. The "Great Trek" is the seminal event in South African history
that provided the symbolic images crucial to the ethos of Afrikaner nationalism that many
white South Africans still celebrate.'^
In the 1850s, after much turmoil between the British administration and the Dutch
settlers, the British appeared to withdrawal from direct political control over the South
African interior

The discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa changed that.

The development of the diamond fields at Kimberly and the gold mines of the
Witwatersrand transformed South African society

From the 1870s, the British adopted

an aggressive thrust into the whole sub-continent. In the course of two decades,
Basutoland, Griqualand West, the South African Republic in the Transvaal, the Transkei,
and Bechuanaland were conquered or annexed, the Zulu and Pedi were defeated, and
their lands brought under imperial control.By the end of the 1880s, the British had
effectively exerted control, either directly or through their colonies, over a large number
of African societies.

However, the British were unable to accomplish their goal of a

South African Confederation.. The reason was primarily due to resistance by the Boer
trekkers in the Transvaal whose farm and ranch land were being overtaken by miners and
mining companies. The British agreed to withdrawal from the Transvaal in 1881, which
marked a significant growth of Afrikaner nationalism and resentment at continued British
influence in the region.
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The Boers, or Dutch farmers, were in constant turmoil with the indigenous
populations as well as the British authority The process of conquest of African politics
in the last three decades of the nineteenth century was the direct result of a more
aggressive British imperial intervention. The process largely destroyed indigenous
independence and cemented Boer segregationists ideals. However, it was not until the
early twentieth century that a concerted ideology and overarching plan of segregation was
developed.
In the early 1890s, South Africa was still divided into settler colonies and Boer
republics. It took a major war between them before the Union of South Africa was
formed in 1910.^^ The South African War of 1899-1902 and its aftermath marked the
end of the protracted process of the conquest of South Africa by settler and imperial
powers. The Union dashed African hopes of regaining access to land encouraged by
British rhetoric before and during the war The new government entrenched white
supremacy into the constitution.^^
Economic and political stability required incorporation of Afrikaner politicians into
the central organs of government rather than self-governing Boer provinces. Therefore,
the new constitution of 1910 did not follow the Australian pattern of federalism. The
constitution established a union, with major central government power In an ominous
sign of what lie ahead, the constitution upheld white unity at the expense of black
political and land rights.^^ In 1914, with the passage of the Natives Land Act of 1913, the
government allowed blacks to settle on only 7 percent of South Africa's land (which was
increased to 14 percent in 1936) in "Native Reserves." These areas became the basis of
the "homelands" of the apartheid era.^^ The passage of more segregationist and racially
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discriminatory acts followed until the government officially adopted Apartheid in 1948
under D.F Malan and the National Party

For the next half-century, until Nelson

Mandela was inaugurated as South Africa's first black president in 1994, black South
Africans struggled under the oppression of the apartheid government.
Mandela retired in 1999 He left the presidency to Thabo Mbeki who sought to define
South Africa's role at the turn of the millennium in terms of his notion of an "African
Renaissance," by which the country would lead the continent out of its poverty and
alienation.'^' Jackson and Rosberg assert that it is necessary to consider the crucial role
played by leaders and their actions on the public life of new states in contemporary
Africa. Personal-rule continued under President Mbeki in South Africa.
Mbeki's administration began two years after the new government implemented the
post-apartheid constitution. His administration started during a period of transition.
Rosberg and Jackson consider this origin—when one institutionalized order had broken
down and another had not yet ftilly replaced it, typical for the development of personal
regimes.Another effect of an unstable period transition is the creation of a risk
environment that facilitates the transmission of HIV

South Africa's peculiar history

has made it fertile ground for the spread of AIDS.^"*

History of HIV/AID S in South Africa
AIDS began under the old order, and burgeoned under the new, which complicated
attempts to respond to it. The initial epidemic, virtually confined to the gay white male
community, surfaced at the same time as it did elsewhere in the developed world. A
newspaper headline announced "Gay Plague Hits South Africa" and intimated that
homosexual men were polluting white society Homosexuality was illegal in South
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Africa, and in the 1980s, the gay community kept a low profile,

By the time this first

outbreak peaked in South Africa in 1989, it was clear that, like many countries in subSaharan Africa, South Africa faced a new, heterosexually transmitted epidemic,
predominantly affecting black African communities.^^
The racially differentiated nature of the epidemic has made it more difficult to
manage. The fact that it is sexually transmitted and that HIV is believed to have its
origins in Africa have, on the one hand, fueled racist stereotypes, discrimination, and
Afro-pessimism, and, on the other, prompted anger, denial, and genocidal conspiracy
theories.Had the disease afflicted all South Africans equally, regardless of race, the
politics of the epidemic would undoubtedly have looked different.

Apartheid Origins
The apartheid regime was ill prepared to handle the new challenge. It responded to
the first phase of the epidemic by ensuring the safety of the blood and blood-product
supply as soon as an HIV test was available, and by providing some funding for
education campaigns, training, counseling, and research. An AIDS budget of R 1 million
in 1987 grew to almost R 22 million by 1992-1993, but fell marginally the following
year This was far short of the World Health Organization's recommendations of R 143
million a year for South Africa at the time.^^ From the beginning of the AIDS epidemic
in South Afnca, the government failed to take the 1986 WHOAFRO recommendation
seriously Shrinking funds in the face of a growing epidemic stirred suspicions that the
government was not taking the matter seriously, because it was now clear AIDS was
going to affect blacks more than whites. Some also seemed to believe South Africa was
"different" from the rest of Africa, and would not suffer the devastation seen to the north.
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or that the country could insulate itself from the epidemic by keeping out infected
foreigners. An attempt to legislate the exclusion of people who tested positive for HIV,
aimed particularly at Malawian migrant mineworkers who had high infection rates, met
with outrage from the National Union of Mineworkers, who blamed the disease on the
migrant labor system itself, which provided "fertile ground for an AIDS epidemic, and
the state and industry should bear the responsibility
The political circumstances in which the epidemic arrived made the efforts of the
South African government to deal with it more problematic. The mid-1980s saw the
country in a state of unprecedented political turmoil and violence, with blacks bent on
overthrowing the government by making the country "ungovernable." A major feature of
black resistance was the school boycott, which kept children in some areas out of school
for years at a stretch. In other areas, the schools themselves turned into "sites of struggle"
for political education. "Liberation before Education" was the call. In 1986, the same
year the World Health Organization's Regional Office for Africa convened in South
Africa and published its recommendation, pamphlets appeared proclaiming "The Year of
No School.AIDS, which had not yet found its way to South Africa, did not seem to be
on the minds of South Africans who were in the midst of revolution. The UNDP and
UNAIDS estimates that, between 1984 and 1986, three hundred children were killed, one
thousand wounded, eleven thousand detained, and eighteen thousand arrested on protest
charges.'" As Saths Cooper, a clinical psychologist and activist, has remarked, there was
"little normality in the lives of politicized children. No good familial relationships, no
normal schooling, no integrated existence. Norm restraints were non-existent."'*^
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The children of those turbulent years, now in their twenties and thirties, bear the brunt
of today's HIV/AIDS epidemic. The 1999 antenatal survey show that over 25 percent of
twenty to twenty-nine year olds, and 22 percent of thirty to thirty-four year olds, are
infected. There probably could not have been more effective prevention campaigns by
the previous government to forestall this. While AIDS is inevitably politicized, the
superheated political climate between 1984 and 1994 ensured that people of all
ideological persuasions interpreted, manipulated, or ignored it to suit their own political
agenda.
AIDS proved a powerful image for social disorder in the 1980s, metaphorically
evoking white fears about escalating black political protests and the disintegration of
apartheid.Through the 1970s and 1980s, as the country slipped into recession, the
currency devalued, and the union movement consolidated its strength, the country's
economic vulnerability was of prime public concern. AIDS heightened the country's
sense of economic crisis and anxieties about dependence on a volatile African labor
force. Images associated with AIDS embraced current political tension. The government
banned the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party in the
1980s, but their insignia, symbols, and songs were part of the popular uprising led from
within the country during the mid-1980s.'''^ The government acted directly against the
1986 WHOAFRO recommendation to make the public fully aware of the nature of AIDS
and HIV, the modes of transmission, and its importance as a health concern while placing
emphasis on the feasibility of preventing HIV infection and on teaching how AIDS
transmission does not occur through casual contact with infected persons. The
government attempted to discredit the ANC by characterizing HIV as the new swart
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gevaar (black peril) sweeping down from the north in the form of ANC guerrillas. The
apartheid government launched a smear campaign and distributed pamphlets in
Johannesburg in 1988, which warned "socialize with the ANC freedom fighters and cry
and die from AIDS," in a fijrther attempt to damage the reputation of the ANC and scare
potential supporters.
The association between AIDS and the ANC implied that the organization and
political protests were a disease spreading across the country, which unless rooted out
and destroyed, could lead to an ugly and violent death. In 1990, when the ANC was
unbanned, the government distributed another smear pamphlet warning parents of ANC
exiles that returnees would be quarantined and tested for AIDS Other pamphlets,
claimed that all blacks would be infected with AIDS by 1992 and that the disease was
spread by informal contact, such as sneezing and coughing, or by mosquitoes/^ The
Conservative Party insisted that AIDS could be spread by informal contact in its effort to
reinforce the fears among its supporters about social integration."^^
Any attempt to put conventional AIDS education into black schools- assuming they
had been functioning—would undoubtedly have been met with suspicion and hostility
Given the conservatism of South Africa's black and white parents, sex education in
schools has long been problematic. What safer-sex campaigns there were provoked
criticism and anger

In 1988, AIDS posters targeted separately at white and black

audiences were dismissed by antiapartheid groups as "typical of government racist
propaganda." Non-collaboration and pressures to keep the state isolated internationally
were integral parts of the opposition's strategy—a strategy that created its own dilemmas,
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went ahead with plans to desegregate hospitals, schools, swimming pools, blood banks,
and other amenities. Anonymous pamphlets defended the rights of whites to "survive in
an AIDS sea," and demanded compulsory testing for returning ANC exiles or legislation
to make AIDS a notifiable disease.
In the antiapartheid camp, there were many grassroots community groups, churches,
student organizations, and nongovernmental organizations involved in AIDS initiatives
by the late 1980s and early 1990s, but their efforts were for the most part fragmented and
sporadic. The major alliance partners that were to form the new government did little.
The African National Congress had signaled its concern—but had offered little in the way
of concrete interventions. In April 1990, 250 delegates, including representatives of the
ANC, the United Democratic Front, the National Medical and Dental Association, and
other antiapartheid organizations, met at a conference on health and welfare in Maputo,
and discussed AIDS. The delegates passed a resolution calling for immediate action by
"progressive" organizations in the face of the impending AIDS "crisis." The resolution
urged delegates to play a leading role in AIDS campaigns "situated within the broader
struggle for political change." It also urged senior political leadership to become
involved to overcome the suspicion around AIDS that the apartheid government had
aroused.A year later, AIDS analyst, Mary Crewe, remarked "one has yet to hear any of
the [ANC] National Executive raise the issue of AIDS at a political rally or public
meeting."^*'
While the ANC and affiliated organizations were clearly aware of the AIDS threat, a
coherent plan to address the disease as laid out in the WHO AFRO recommendation
eluded them. In 1991, the ANC journal, Mayibuye, had to admit that the democratic
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such as South Africa's exclusion from the World Health Organization's Global Program
on AIDS.^^
In 1993, on the eve of the transition to democracy, the government had reported only a
few hundred AIDS cases. In the black townships, the epidemic remained invisible.
Many black militants dismissed the AIDS scare as a government fabrication, the acronym
said to stand for "Afrikaner Invention to Deprive us of Sex." The emphasis on condom
usage raised suspicions that the real objective was to reinforce the government's
"genocidal" family-planning program. Talk of safer sex seemed at the time like "a plot
devised by the government, supported by the employers, and pumped through a restricted
press to convince black people to have less sex, and therefore fewer b a b i e s . I n
November 1988, an article by Mzala, in Sechaba, an official publication of the ANC in
exile, questioned the African origin of the virus. The Sechaba essay suggested that the
virus may have been developed "in the secrecy of the laboratories of many imperialist
countries.Some said police sprayed the virus in tear gas; others argued that it had
been deliberately spread to black prostitutes by infected ex-ANC guerrillas (askaris)
working for the police.
As AIDS activist and antiapartheid campaigner, Ivan Toms, said at the time: "there is
no possibility that the present government could, even if it has the inclination, run an
effective campaign to limit the spread of HIV infection. It has no credibility or
legitimacy whatsoever among blacks.

The response of the white right wing served

further to politicize AIDS. In Parliament, AIDS figured prominently in political
infighting. Right-wing newspapers insisted that "evidence" that HIV could be
transmitted by casual contact meant that whites would be in danger if the government
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movements' "deep commitment and sense of urgency ..[had not] translated into
practice."" The political priorities of the time saw issues such as housing,
unemployment, poverty, and violence take center stage. AIDS, with its unpopular
message of condoms and safer sex—a message necessarily overlapping with that of the
government—was not taken well. Black youth were particularly unreceptive to warnings
about AIDS. Brutalized by the turmoil of the 1980s, they had learned to live with the
fear of death. Despite the guidelines in the WHO AFRO recommendation, AIDS
education was poor, and public awareness was low In a survey of seventeen- to twentythree-year-olds in KwaZulu in 1990, Dr Darryl Hackland, KwaZulu secretary of health,
found that a third of the respondents believed that AIDS was "a joke." Ninety percent
said that they would never use a condom. For those caught up in political violence, AIDS
was "almost a laughing matter It's a case of eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we
die!

Whether the safer sex message came from the white government, or from parents

and elders, whose political timidity they had ridiculed, it was clear that the militant young
were in no mood for messages of caution and moderation. Politicians hoping for the
youth vote avoided the issue of AIDS altogether
It was clear that interventions could not wait for a new political order In compliance
with the WHOAFRO recommendation that a comprehensive strategy on AIDS start at the
operational level with creation of a National AIDS Committee, a Task Force, or the like,
the health secretariat of the ANC indicated willingness to meet with the Department of
National Health and Population Development (DNHPD) to formulate a strategy in
November 1991 They convened a meeting on January 15, 1992, attended by people in
the AIDS field. The participants resolved to convene a national forum on AIDS, and to
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mandate the ANC and the DNHPD to set up a steering committee to plan a response to
the AIDS crisis/^ In October 1992, the organizations held a national conference-"South
Africa United Against AIDS" The 442 delegates recommended a national strategy that
would address education, counseling, prevention, health care, welfare, research, human
rights, law reform, and socioeconomic issues. The National AIDS Coordinating
Committee of South Africa (NACOSA), which emerged from the conference, was to
implement a national strategy on HIV/AIDS.
NACOSA developed the strategy through an intensive program of consultation via a
national and regional NACOSA network, with input from political parties, trade unions,
the business sector, civic associations, churches, academics, government departments,
AIDS service organizations, and others. The network developed a draft of a national
AIDS strategy for discussion at a strategy workshop in September 1993 The strategy
was comprehensive, presenting a detailed plan to achieve three overriding objectives: the
prevention of HIV transmission, the reduction of the personal and social impact of HIV,
and the mobilizations of local, provincial, national, and international resources to fight
the epidemic.*'"
After the 1994 elections, the government endorsed the NACOSA strategy as the
National AIDS Plan.^' Located in the Department of Health under the directorate of
HIV/AIDS and STDs, the program's budget doubled, and donor ftinds grew With
cabinet endorsement, it looked like the plan would have the multi-sectoral support and
level of political commitment that had proved crucial in successful programs elsewhere.
Despite the cabinet endorsement, and being designated a Presidential Lead Project in the
Reconstruction and Development Program, AIDS came to be seen as simply a health
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i s s u e . T h e resources necessary for a plan of the size and complexity envisaged by
NACOSA were not forthcoming because AIDS failed to be prioritized in the way in
which NACOSA had envisaged, and because the new government faced the difficult task
of trying to restructure the fragmented systems created by apartheid and weld together the
sometimes reluctant, even obstructive, old and new bureaucrats. Tension between
national, provincial, and local governments over budgetary allocations, program design,
and policy decisions also impaired implementation.'''*
A further dimension to the problem was the intrusion of the WHO's Global Program
on AIDS (GPA). The GPA program not only emphasized priorities different from
NACOSA and required even more money to implement; it also talked of an "African
approach," as if the continent were a homogeneous whole. Rather than strengthening the
government plan through collaboration with NACOSA, the GPA shook the confidence of
local groups and blurred responsibility for implementation.^" By 1996, the AIDS Plan
was in serious trouble. Two years into its implementation, not only had HIV prevalence
climbed from 7,6 percent in 1994 to 14.2 percent in 1996, the ideal of "South Africa
United Against AIDS" had not been realized, A major review of the AIDS strategy in
1997 also drew attention to the lack of political leadership on the issue,

Effective and

creative leadership characteristics were lacking severely when it came to HIV/AIDS
prevention, awareness, and education. Both government and NACOSA leadership failed
to achieve even the first characteristic, understanding that the bureaucratic hierarchies
were ineffective and advocating a community of responsibility Rose Smart, head of the
Health Department's National HIV/AIDS and STD Directorate, wrote: "Despite the
impression internationally that there is significant political commitment in South Africa
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to addressing HIV/AIDS, in reality this was found to be limited (with few exceptions) to
the Minister and the Department of Health.
The credibility of the government's AIDS strategy was also affected by a series of
scandals and blunders, beginning with the Department of Health's commissioning, in
1995, of a musical. The government intended Sarafina II to take the AIDS message to
the public in a popular form. It was a disaster on a number of levels. An inappropriate,
all-star, big-budget production, it cost a whopping R 14.2 million. The government had
not authorized the expenditure, there were irregularities in the tendering process, and the
message the creators intended to convey was far from clear The media and opposition
parties had a field day reporting on the issue, but it also served to drive further wedges
between government and AIDS organizations.''^
The organizations pointed out that, at a time when funds were scarce, the money could
have been better spent on smaller local projects with a better understanding of AIDS
issues. They resented the increasingly non-consultative way in which the Health Minister
made decisions, and that the expected the organizations to refrain from criticism.*^^ A
body representing more than two hundred organizations working in the AIDS field tried
to take up its concerns about the play with the Heahh Department in a constructive way,
but eventually went public and assisted the Public Protector in his investigation of the
matter The government's response to criticism was particularly disturbing. It raised
questions about the relationship of NGOs and the government. Many AIDS service
organizations (ASOs) relied on government funding and felt unable to challenge the
Health Department. Despite the minister's stated commitment to transparency and
accountability, the ASOs were feeling increasingly marginalized by her actions. Some
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even felt that the funding cut to ASOs from R 19 million to R 2 million in 1998 was
partly motivated by spite directed at a sector that had tried to hold her to account/^
While investigation of the Sarafina II matter was still in progress, the government
found itself embroiled in yet another major controversy surrounding their support for a
suspect AIDS drug, Virodene P058. The drug, an industrial solvent
(dimethylformamide), had previously been tested in cancer therapy, but abandoned as
ineffective and toxic. When a team of researchers at the University of Pretoria noticed
Virodene had antiviral properties, they administered the drug to a number of AIDS
patients, without clearing its use via the normal ethical and scientific protocols. On
January 22, 1997, the researchers attended a cabinet meeting with patients who had
purportedly seen their full-blown AIDS reversed by the drug. After receiving a standing
ovation, the researchers asked for a grant of R 3.7 million for further research. They
claimed it was necessary to take the unusual step of going directly to the cabinet, after the
"AIDS research establishment" had blocked their work because they refiised to share
their patent rights.^'
Over the following year, allegations of government financial involvement, repeated
rejections of Virodene's credentials by the Medicines Control Council (MCC, the
country's drug regulatory authority), and pleas by people with HIV/AIDS to be allowed
access to the drug vied for headlines. Like Sarafina II, Virodene succeeded in dividing
those who should have been united in the fight against AIDS. This time not only the
department of health, but also the whole cabinet, including the deputy president, Thabo
Mbeki, was involved in a scientific matter on which they were ill equipped to pass
judgment. The initial elation on the part of people with HIV/AIDS that a cheap cure
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might have been found, their desperation to get access to the drug, and their anger and
despair when they realized how threadbare the claims were increased their skepticism
about government AIDS initiatives/^ The 1986 WHOAFRO recommendation seemed to
have fallen by the wayside.
The AIDS epidemic reflects the history of the region. Migration and mobility created
patterns of sexual behavior and mixing which are perfect for the spread of sexually
transmitted disease. In addition, high levels of inequality aided the creation of risk
environment by shifting previously unequal gender relations further imbalance, forcing
women to be more dependent. The breakdown of family structure in the rural areas and
townships, government policy toward its black population, and the violence that
accompanied the end of apartheid combined to create a widespread philosophy of
fatalism. This perception that "what will be, will be" in turn diminished individual
worth, responsibility and accountability The feeling is still prevalent and makes people
live for today without valuing tomorrow It can be summed up in a shrug of the
shoulders and the response; "if AIDS kills me in five years' time, so what?"'^

Magnitude of HIV/AIDS in South Africa
HIV caught most South Africans by surprise. The virus battered much of Central and
East Africa in the 1980s. However, HIV is a relatively new arrival in South Africa, its
spread hastened by the opening up of the post-apartheid economy to greater trade and
migration flows from the north.

As apartheid was ending in South Africa, an influx of

commercial trade and migrant workers from neighboring countries opened up a kind of
viral superhighway for the epidemic. Legislators, grappling with the momentous political
and social changes at hand, failed to foresee that these changes might also bring deadly
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consequences, and failed to implement a proper prevention strategy Forced
displacement of black people under apartheid, and the deploying of workers far from
their families, had also led to higher rates of extra marital sex and prostitution/^
In South Africa, HIV rates soared during Nelson Mandela's administration, a fact that
he later acknowledged. "It's the silence that is letting the disease sweep through the
country," Mr Mandela said on World AIDS day in December 1998. He concluded, "It is
time to break the silence."^*' In 1999, Dr Peter Piot, Assistant Secretary General of the
United Nations and head of its AIDS programs applauded Mr Mandela and his successor
Mr Mbeki for calling national attention to AIDS, but said it took a long time and many
deaths could have been prevented if they had spoken out earlier

The lack of dialogue

and effective action to prevent HIV transmission has encouraged the drastic increase in
HIV infection and related deaths.
The UNAIDS/WHO Working Group on Global HIV/AIDS and STI Surveillance
estimates that five million adults and children were living with HIV/AIDS in South
Africa at the end of 2001 and that 360,000 adults and children died of the disease that
year

The same study estimated that 660,000 children under the age of 15 lost their

mother or father or both parents by the end of 2001

Every year as many as 100,000

babies are born with HIV in South Africa, where one in four pregnant women are HIV
positive.^" The average adult-prevalence rate stood at a staggering 20.1 percent by the
end of 2001
The Working Group has conducted national sentinel surveillance of antenatal clinic
attendees in South Africa since 1990 and surveillance data is available by province and at
a national level. Antenatal HIV prevalence in South Africa increased rapidly from 0 7
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percent in 1990 to 10.5 percent in 1995 and then 22,8 percent in 1998.^^ HIV prevalence
among antenatal clinic attendees was 22.4 percent in 24.5 percent in 1999 and 2000
respectively In some provinces, the rate of increase was even more drastic. For
instance, in KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumulaga, and Guateng provinces, HIV prevalence rose
swiftly from 7 1 percent in 1990 to 36.5 in 2000. HIV prevalence among sex workers
tested in Natal increased from 50 percent in 1997 to 61 percent in 1998.^
One study, conducted by the Medical Research Council (MRC) with partial
government fianding, and published in October 2001, suggests that as many as 7 million
South Africans will have died of AIDS-related illnesses by 2010.^'* According to
UNAIDS, average life expectancy in South Africa is only 47 years, instead of 66,
because of AIDS. Orphanages are bursting with children whose families have fallen
victim to AIDS: the study expects two million by 2010. Some companies in KwaZuluNatal have barred employees from going to more than two funerals a week.^^
The impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on production and the costs of fighting the
disease might cause South Africa's economy to be 17-20 percent smaller by the year
2010 than it would have been without the syndrome, according to a study presented at a
conference in Johannesburg in September 2000, by two US economists, Jeffrey Lewis of
the World Bank and Channing Arndt of Purdue University ^

Political Leadership in South Africa
South Africa has the largest absolute number of HIV-positive people in the world.
Yet, from the president down, there is a failure to talk publicly about the scale of the
problem.Alarming as the forecasts are. South Africa's government has barely
awakened to the problem.

Many had hoped that President Nelson Mandela would
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spearhead the South African AIDS program. Mandela seldom addressed the issue in
South Africa, even though he did make a major speech on AIDS at the World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in February 1997 "When the history of our time is
written," said Mandela, "it will record the collective efforts of societies responding to a
threat that has put in the balance the future of whole nations. Future generations will
judge us on the adequacy of our response." He concluded his speech by saying South
Africa's National AIDS Program, conscious of the need "to put the effort to combat AIDS
on a higher plane," had "made the call for 'A New Struggle!

It was a stirring

message, but one he seldom repeated from South African platforms.In his speech,
Mandela urged the world to help control AIDS in Africa, but at home never made it a
.
91
priority

AIDS workers hoped that a speech by Mandela to be aired on national radio and
television stations on October 9, 1998—billed, "Ten Minutes to Save the Nation"—would
help focus public attention on the issue. There was deep disappointment when Mandela
delegated the job to Thabo Mbeki. The address, filmed at a Salvation Army Children's
home, with Mbeki sitting stiffly in his crisp business suit and tie, surrounded by HIVpositive children, had obviously been designed for Mandela's more informal style. In the
speech, Mbeki said nothing new, but did admit, "We have closed our eyes as a Nation,
hoping the truth was not real." He added: "Nothing can prevent infection except our own
behavior

The point of the speech was to draw people into a "Partnership Against

AIDS." On one of the rare occasions in which Mandela publicly addressed the AIDS
issue, at a World AIDS Day rally at Mtubatuba in KwaZulu Natal in 1998, Mandela
commented "because it spreads mainly through sex, prevention requires of us that we
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speak of it in a way our traditions, our cultures and our religions provide little
guidance.
In September 1998, the government held an "AIDS crisis summit" to launch a new
"Partnership Against AIDS," meant to revitalize South Africa's flagging program. The
minister of health was late, and Mbeki made a brief appearance on the way to open a
World Athletics meeting. Further controversies have surrounded the provision of
antiretroviral drugs to prevent mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) of HIV With a
predominantly heterosexually transmitted epidemic, women of childbearing age are
commonly infected, and stand a 25-35 percent chance of passing the infection on to their
babies. The use of AZT (zidovudine) administered from thirty-six weeks of pregnancy
and for six weeks to the infant has been shown to lower transmission substantially, and
recent research suggests that a new drug, nevirapine (Viramune), may achieve even better
results with just a single dose during labor and one dose to the baby within seventy-two
hours of birth.

Given the humanitarian considerations and the fact that such

prophylaxis can be demonstrated to be highly cost-effective by comparison with repeated
hospital care for an infected infant, the case for anti-retrovirals seems clear
The main obstacle in curbing the spread of HIV is not technical, but cultural, the
tyranny, familiar across Africa, of denial and taboo .

In October 1998, Minister Zuma

announced that she and her nine provincial health ministers had decided not to make the
drug available and to discontinue planned pilot projects to test it. She pointed out that the
government's priority was prevention and stated that "The AZT treatment will have a
limited effect on the epidemic, as we are targeting individuals already infected.

As

critics were quick to point out, the prevention of MTCT was the object of using AZT, but
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Zuma was adamant. Even after GlaxoWellcome, AZT's manufacturer, drastically
reduced the price of the drug, Zuma insisted it was too expensive, given that the
intervention would also require testing, counseling, formula feeding, and technical
support. James Mclntyre and Glenda Gray, directors of the Perinatal HIV Research Unit
at Soweto's Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital, wrote of their concern that attempts to
discuss the issue constructively had been "overshadowed by inflexible public statements
by the Minister's spokesperson, including questioning the political motives of those who
advocate MTCT prevention strategies." They noted that while South Africa guaranteed
free maternity treatment and free treatment for children less than six years, including
expensive hospital procedures, it "specifically excludes the provision of a R 300-R 400
drug treatment which prevents half the cases of pediatric HIV
In the Western Cape, provincial health authorities decided not to follow national
policy In January of 1999, they went ahead with pilot projects to provide AZT and free
formula at two clinics in Cape Town communities with substantial HIV infection levels.^
By 1999, Zuma's position had become untenable. The health minister had stonewalled on
AZT, become immersed in bitter battles with the pharmaceutical industry, failed to
consult or answer to the AIDS constituency, and presided over a series of minor and
major public-relations disasters.

After the 1999 election. President elect, Thabo

Mbeki, named Zuma minister of foreign affairs. Her replacement, Dr Manto TshabalalaMsimang, appeared more approachable. She arranged early on, to meet with NACOSA,
with doctors involved in MTCT prevention, and with representatives of the
pharmaceutical industry Within weeks of Tshabalala-Msimang's appointment, she
organized a trip to Uganda to review their nevirapine project and to investigate how the
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country, much poorer than South Africa, had managed to bring their AIDS epidemic
under control. There were hopes that confrontational stalemates would end and
partnerships become possible."" In June 1999, Tshabalala-Msimang had already said that
the government was examining finding ways to ensure a sustainable AZT program for
MTCT prevention.

Type of Personal-Rule
Personal-rule in South Africa began under Nelson Mandela, and continued with Thabo
Mbeki, elected president on June 16, 1999 Mbeki has an autocratic style of leadership.
He is a ruler that controls the government and the state without having to share power
with other leaders. For South Africa, it is a striking shift in substance and style. Mandela
delegated many responsibilities, serving as a charismatic caretaker president. Mbeki
thrives on details, closely manages his cabinet, and often analyzes important matters way
into the night.His critics say this means that the president sidelines his own ministers
and experts. In practice, it means that all but his most capable ministers sometimes fade
from view

Mbeki is no stranger to challenging the establishment. During the

apartheid years, he was among the first members of the African National Congress to
argue that negotiation with whites, not armed revolution, would lead to the demise of
apartheid. However, Mbeki's autocratic style of leadership has impeded his ability to
create effective approaches to deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa, For
instance, it was clearly Mbeki, not the health minister, who drove the government's
inquiry into the causes and treatments of AIDS.^*^^
Mbeki was the one who came across the research by U.S. biochemists Peter Duesberg,
Charles Geshekter, and David Rasnick, who deny that HIV causes AIDS and argue that it
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is the result of poverty and malnutrition.'"^ He was the one who began questioning the
safety of the commonly prescribed drug AZT after reading criticism of the drug on the
Internet. Mbeki contacted local and foreign researchers, surrounded himself with books
and journals, and consulted with the minister of health when he came across medical
terms he did not understand'"^

Creative and Effective Leadership
Mbeki has failed to realize each of Gordon's characteristics of effective and creative
leaders when it comes to HIV/AIDS. In his address to the National Council of Provinces,
President Mbeki, ushered in a new phase in the AZT debate, saying that, as there was a
large scientific literature on the toxicity of AZT, he felt it would be irresponsible not to
heed these warnings. He asked the minister of health, as a matter of urgency, to establish
"where the truth lies." He also urged council members to consult "the huge volume of
literature on this matter available on the Internet so that all of us can approach this issue
from the same base of information."'"^ Mbeki neither advocated a community of
responsibility about AIDS and its effects nor promoted change. Some governmental
officials worried that Mbeki's ruminations on AIDS, and the media's simplification of his
views, may have undermined efforts to prevent the disease.'"^
Mbeki's caution following the Virodene debacle was understandable, but the evidence
on the Internet would have reinforced the urgent need to make AZT available. It was
endorsed by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease Control in
Atlanta, and the Medicines Control Council of South Africa, and was on the essential
drugs list of the WHO. Despite this, Tshabalala-Msimang said AZT weakened the

72

immune system and posed the danger that "mutations" might lead to mothers producing
children with disabilities, '

AIDS activists were irate.

A series of subsequent events leading up to the AIDS 2000 Conference in July dashed
hopes that there would be some attempt at "damage control" over the president's
statement. In the face of rapidly rising infection rates, and the disarray among the forces
that should have been collaborating to turn the tide, AIDS organizations had repeatedly
called for a multi-sectoral national AIDS commission, to address the problem. There
were hopes that a new South African National AIDS Council (SANAC) might fulfill this
role. When Deputy President Jacob Zuma launched SANAC on January 14, 2000, public
reactions ranged from indifference to despair. Instead of the envisaged council of
experts, SANAC appeared to duplicate the existing Interministerial Committee and the
"sector" representatives of the partnership initiative. Of the fifteen cabinet ministers and
government representatives, many lacked any real interest in the AIDS issue, as their
performance on the Interministerial Committee, established in 1997, had demonstrated.
The sixteen sector representatives were an odd assortment. The six-hundred-plus
NGOs and ASOs that dealt with AIDS had one representative. High-profile
organizations like the AIDS Law Project and the Treatment Action Campaign were not
represented. There were three members representing sport, the hospitality industry, and
"celebrities," and there were two traditional healers—but no scientists, no medical
practitioners, and no representatives from either the Medical Research Council or the
Medicines Control Council. The dust had barely settled when it became clear that
Mbeki's skepticism about AZT extended to a wider mistrust of the whole "science of
AIDS." While surfing the Internet he had come up with pages like virusmyth.com, where
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a small network of AIDS dissidents publishes alternative—and discredited—theories of the
epidemic. Among these theories is the belief that HIV—if it exists—is a harmless
"passenger" virus, that AIDS is a "lifestyle" disease, where, recreational drugs, or even
AZT, cause the breakdown of the immune system, and that the increased morbidity and
mortality of the disease in Africa result from poverty, which aggravates old disease
patterns.
Mbeki's inquiry into these alternative theories, and their protagonists led him to set up
the "Presidential International Panel of Scientists on HIV/AIDS in Africa."''^ In a
pamphlet explaining its purpose, the Ministry of Health said that the panel would explore
"all aspects of the challenge of developing prevention and treatment strategies that are
appropriate to the African reality " The ministry noted that the inclusion of dissidents,
who believed that AIDS was "due to lifestyle factors such as poverty and malnutrition"
rather than HIV, had "caused uproar among the scientific and medical fraternity " Since
orthodox treatments had met with little success against AIDS in Africa, "blind acceptance
of conventional wisdom would be irresponsible."'^^
The thirty-three-member panel consisted of both dissident and mainstream scientists,
including some of the best known on each side. At their first meeting in May, just two
months before the AIDS 2000 Conference in Durban, Mbeki appeared to hope that the
scientists could reach some kind of compromise position. Science, unlike politics, is
based on a method that tests hypotheses and ruthlessly discards what does not fit the
facts; its aim is not consensus.''"* On April 3, 2000, Mbeki took the unusual step of
sending hand-addressed letters to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Britain's Prime
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Minister Tony Blair, U.S. President Bill Clinton, and other world leaders, setting out his
position on the epidemic.
The letter was an impassioned plea to revisit the African AIDS epidemic. Its tone so
stunned the Clinton administration, that according to the Washington Post, which
published a leaked copy of the letter, they checked to see if it was a hoax, and attempted
to suppress it lest it spark international controversy

In the letter, Mbeki compared

AIDS in the West-a declining epidemic, "largely homosexually transmitted," where
relatively few people have died—with AIDS in "Africa," a rapidly growing heterosexually
transmitted epidemic, which seemed destined to kill tens of millions of people—a
"uniquely African catastrophe." Given the differences, "a simple superimposition of
Western experience on African reality would be absurd and illogical." South Africa's
task, argued Mbeki, was "to search for specific and targeted responses to the specifically
African incidence of HIV/AIDS." To exclude dissident opinions from this search would
be to "freeze scientific discourse on HIV/AIDS at the specific point this discourse had
reached in 1984
In reality, it was the dissidents who were frozen in the 1980s. Perhaps the most
alarming aspect of Mbeki's letter was his intemperate defense of this embattled minority,
portrayed as fighting to have their voices heard against a world guilty of terrorizing and
intimidating them, much as the "racist apartheid tyranny" once did in South Africa.
Mbeki's letter provoked strong reactions locally and internationally, ranging from shock
and outrage to derision. When the president visited the United States in May of 2000,
some feared that the AIDS issue could swamp the wider agenda. The New York Times
wrote that critics were in something of a quandary and that "Most seem to have decided
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that the best offense is to give no offense, an approach they say is being counseled by the
Clinton administration." There were fears that Mbeki would become stubborn if he were
pressured."^
Mbeki had still failed to meet any of Gordon's characteristics of creative and effective
leadership. He almost did the opposite of inspiring, motivating, and stimulating, leading
through personal persuasion, and valuing emotions as well as ideas. During the visit,
Mbeki avoided controversy He set out the government's conventional AIDS strategies
and pointed to the real problems, financial and infrastructure-related that providing
antiretroviral therapy would create. He flatly denied that he had ever said AZT was
ineffective—"pure invention" — or that HIV did not cause AIDS, but did say that the
African epidemic presented particular and unique problems.

Clinton appeared to have

sympathy for Mbeki's problem, especially regarding the high price of drugs. Jane Silver
of the American Foundation for AIDS Research in Washington commented: "Finally the
world is focusing on AIDS in Africa. Part of the challenge is making sure it is not
sidetracked."''^
The AIDS 2000 Conference, the thirteenth in the international conference series, was
to be held for the first time on African soil—the epicenter of the pandemic—with Durban
itself in a province where 33 percent of women in the 1999 antenatal survey had tested
HIV-positive. However, the controversy kicked up by Mbeki had turned AIDS in Africa
into a front-page story Back home, scientists, embarrassed and concerned by Mbeki's
stance in light of the upcoming conference, had tried to cool things down. There were
calls for Mbeki to leave science to the scientists.
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The scientific panel met for the last time on July 3 and 4, 2000, having supposedly
thrashed out their différences in closed Internet debates and discussions since May
Based on the panelists' deliberations at the final meeting, the international community
expected decisions and suggestions. Finding common ground was difficult. Just how
difficult is suggested by Mark Schoofs, one of the few journalists invited as an observer
He reported that David Rasnick, a dissident with whom Mbeki had been in close contact,
proposed that all HIV testing be banned. Stunned South African scientists asked whether
that should include testing the blood supply Rasnick responded: "If 1 had the power to
outlaw the HIV antibody test, I would do it across the board.Rasnick also denied
seeing "any evidence" of an AIDS catastrophe, despite testimony of African physicians to
the contrary While the Ministry of Health publicly applauded the "robust" debate, in
private, Schoofs says, health department officials "veered between amazement and
ridicule" at the outlandish positions taken by dissidents.In the end, the panel was a
face-saving exercise; its main substantive outcome was a decision to reassess the
accuracy of the ELISA test, used internationally to check blood for HIV antibodies.
AIDS workers were predictably fiirious, not only at the waste of money and resources,
but at the message it sent. What point was there in urging people to go for counseling
and testing if the panel was suggesting the tests were not accurate? Those who had tested
positive might now believe their results were false.
The publication in Nature of the Durban Declaration overshadowed the controversy
around the panel. The journal noted that the declaration was a response to the "massive
consternation among all scientists, doctors and many others in the international
community" who work in the AIDS field. In an effort to set the record straight on the
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causal link between HIV and AIDS, five thousand scientists, including local members of
the president's panel, Nobel Prize winners, and directors of leading research institutions
and medical societies, signed the document: "Curbing the spread of this virus must
remain the first step towards eliminating this devastating disease.

Tshabalala-

Msimang said the declaration was "an elitist document" signed exclusively by health
scientists—"You can't have a certain exclusive group of people saying this is what we
believe about HIV and AIDS
With the world's media now focused on Durban, President Mbeki delivered the
opening address to the AIDS 2000 Conference. Instead of clarifying his position, he
sidestepped the issue by concentrating on the role of poverty in ill health and the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa. He also gave a brief outline of the government's AIDS
strategy awareness, prevention, targeting poverty and opportunistic diseases, a "humane"
response to those affected—including orphans—and further research on antiretrovirals. He
did not mention the government's support of vaccine initiatives.

A substantial portion

of his speech repeated findings of a 1995 WHO report, which argued that the world's
biggest killer was "extreme poverty " Mbeki referred in passing to criticism leveled
against him for asking questions—"akin to grave criminal and genocidal misconduct"—but
did not directly address the controversy, except to say that the ELISA test was to be
reassessed. After listing the enormous health problems of Africa, he said, "One of the
consequences of this crisis is the deeply disturbing phenomenon of the collapse of the
immune systems among millions of our people, such that their bodies have no natural
defense against attack by many viruses and bacteria... [I]t seemed to me that we could
not blame everything on a single virus."
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If Mbeki is saying that poverty, ill health, and malnutrition make people vulnerable to
HIV/AIDS, his position is unexceptionable. Some experts hear Mbeki as echoing the
dissident position. It is true that people are dying of "old diseases," but that is the nature
of the epidemic, which destroys the immune system and makes the infected vulnerable to
whatever diseases exist in their environment. While the dissidents may refuse to see a
"new" epidemic, the people in affected countries often noticed the new pattern even
before Western epidemiologists did.
Mbeki's speech deeply disappointed those gathered in Durban. In his closing address,
former president Nelson Mandela urged people to make every effort to bridge that gap
when he said, "in the face of the grave threat posed by HIV/AIDS, we have to rise above
our differences and combine our efforts to save our people. History will judge us harshly
if we fail to do so, and right now

While he talked of Mbeki as a man who took

scientific thinking seriously, and of a government committed to the principles of science
and reason, he deplored the way peripheral debates had distracted attention from the real
life-and-death issues with which AIDS confronts the world. Experience in countries like
Senegal, Uganda, and Thailand proved that HIV/AID S could be prevented by providing
young people with information about abstinence, safe sex, the use of condoms, and the
early treatment of sexually transmitted infections. It was a plainspoken statement of the
facts. Apart from calling for large-scale actions to prevent MTCT, his strategy was not
much different from that outlined by Mbeki. His plea to move from rhetoric to "action at
an unprecedented intensity and scale," and his call to mobilize "all of our resources and
alliances, and to sustain the effort until this war is won," touched a chord. The audience
stood to applaud his address.
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In the face of mounting criticism, Mbeki's own constituency finally stepped in. The
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), South Africa's largest trade-union
body, the SACP, and even some elements in the ANC have publicly asserted that HIV
does indeed cause AIDS. In the words of COSATU president Willie Madisha: "The link
between HIV and AIDS is irrefutable, and any other approach is unscientific and,
unfortunately, likely to confuse people.
As it became clearer that Mbeki's position was not only widening divisions between
the ANC and its alliance partners but also damaging him personally, both at home and
abroad, he, at last, backed down. In October of 2000, he informed the ANC's national
executive committee that he was withdrawing from "the public debate" on the science of
HIV and AIDS

At the same time, the High Court in Pretoria ordered the government

to draw up, by April, a comprehensive plan to stop mothers infecting their children.
Failure, the judge said, would be unreasonable and unconstitutional. The government is
appealing, but some members of the cabinet quietly agree with the court. The next
campaign may concentrate on treating the country's tragically large number of rape
victims.
Mr Mbeki still appears to deny that AIDS is a big problem. His spokesman are
reluctant to list the disease as a top priority for the country, preferring to talk about the
economy, race, housing, poverty, crime, and general health problems.'^' Mbeki's failure
to acknowledge the severity of the problem through speech and action indicates failure to
satisfy the characteristics of effective and creative leadership and has allowed the national
HIV/AIDS prevalence in South Africa to increase.
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WHO's 1986 Recommendation for a Plan of Action in the African Region
The recommendation for a plan of action in the African region of WHO, drawn up in
March 1986, consisted of 1) initial assessment at the national level, 2) the strengthening
of health infrastructure in order to support epidemiological, laboratory, clinical and
prevention activities, educational and informational programs to the general public, risk
groups and health care workers, and 3 ) the exchange of information, including reporting
of AIDS cases. South Africa's government has complied with the first and third
recommendation, but did so before Mbeki became president. Under Mbeki's
administration, the government has failed to fulfill further the seventeen-year-old
recommendation.
Assessment at the national level and the exchange of information established under
the apartheid regime continues. However, analysis shows that Mbeki has done little to
explicitly strengthen the health infrastructure in order to support epidemiological,
laboratory, clinical and prevention activities, educational and informational programs to
the general public, risk groups, and health care workers. His explicit lack of action has
allowed for the expansion of a risk environment where HIV can thrive.

Connections Between Political Leadership and Effective Approaches to the AIDS
Epidemic in South Africa
South Africa's government has largely failed to comply with the WHO
recommendation, and adult HIV prevalence rates have continued to increase. Jackson
and Rosberg's typology employed in conjunction with Gordon's characteristics for
creative and effective leadership illustrate why his leadership skills have not translated
into effective approaches to battle the HIV/AIDS epidemic in his country

81

HIV prevalence rates remain high in South Africa and public attitudes about the
disease have been slow to change. By ignoring the problem and not implementing
important suggestions asserted in the 1986 WHOAFRO recommendation, Mbeki has
been unable to stop or even curb the spread of HIV/AIDS, which today affects almost
every family in South Africa as more than a fifth of the adult population are HIVpositive. 132
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CHAPTER 4
COMPARISON OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND EFFECTIVE APRO ACHES TO
THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN UGANDA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Each day more than 10,000 people in Sub-Saharan Africa contract what is almost
surely a death sentence, and all of them will likely be dead by 2010 The people are
infected with HIV/AID S It is now clear that the deaths of so many adults in their most
productive years will have a devastating impact not only on individual families, but also
on their communities and their countries/ When AIDS emerged from the shadows two
decades ago, few people could predict how the epidemic would evolve, and fewer still
could describe with any certainty the best ways of combating it. Already, more than
twenty million people around the world have died of AIDS. Nearly twice that many are
now living with HIV Experience shows that AIDS can devastate whole regions, knock
decades off national development, and push already-stigmatized groups closer to the
margins of society lust as clearly, experience shows that the right approaches, applied
quickly enough with courage and resolve, can and do result in lower HIV infection rates
and less suffering for those affected by the epidemic.^
The situation is misunderstood and the problems aggravated because of the silence
and governmental inaction surrounding the AIDS epidemic. The silence goes far toward
explaining the passivity of the people in the face of the ravages of the pandemic and the
failure of governments to speak out and act to effectively eradicate the virus.^ Means
already known and easily implemented can defeat AIDS in Africa.The central plank in
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the victory over AIDS is first the recognition by African governments of social and
sexual reality followed by prompt action, which can lower national HIV prevalence rates.
Heads of state and their more powerful ministers must personally and vigorously respond
to the crisis their nations face. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan told
African presidents and prime ministers, donor officials, and civil society members
attending the 2001 African Development Forum in Addis Ababa that "The leadership we
need in Africa cannot come from outside, but rather must flow from within," as he called
upon African heads of state to launch a total war on HIV/AIDS in Africa." Visible
political leadership is critical.^

Presidential Leadership in Uganda and South Africa
Nearly a decade ago, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni chipped a few bricks out
of the wall of silence erected by political leaders around the fearful subject of AIDS in
Africa. Faced with rising sickness and death in his country, Museveni reversed his long
standing opposition to condoms and began talking openly about AIDS/ The subsequent
national response helped bring about a significant fall in the prevalence of HIV infection
in the country ^ In Uganda, powerful leadership at the presidential level has encouraged
widespread changes in attitudes about HIV/AIDS and sexual behavior, which led to a
decline in national HIV prevalence rates. Clearly, Museveni's strong and creative
leadership was key ^ In a speech at Makerere University in Kampala, U.S. Treasury
Secretary Paul O'Neill said, "Thanks to President Museveni's leadership, Uganda has
become the first country in Africa to reduce its AIDS infection rate."'"
Uganda is where the largest number of reported AIDS cases in Africa—nearly two
million in the late 1990's, according to UN figures, resulted.'' President Museveni has

88

gained international acclaim for having elevated HIV/AIDS to a national priority
Infection rates are decreasing.'^ Uganda has successfijlly brought down HIV/AIDS
prevalence from more than 30 percent in the 1980s and the early 1990s to the current rate
of about 6 percent.'^ Through autocratic rule, Museveni followed the 1986 WHO AFRO
recommendation and developed a leadership strategy that fulfilled Gordon's
characteristics of effective and creative leadership.''*
By 1988, a national serosurvey occurred in Uganda, in compliance with the first
aspect of the WHOAFRO recommendation for a Plan of Action: initial assessment at the
national level.'" The survey gauged the magnitude of the epidemic among the adult
population and determined that the average prevalence rate was nine percent."' Museveni
understands that the old centralized bureaucratic hierarchies are dead and advocates
community responsibility He also promotes and initiates change, viewing it as an
opportunity for all stakeholders. Under Museveni, Uganda was the first African country
to respond pro-actively to the AIDS epidemic and adopt a multi-sectoral approach.'^
Museveni mobilized civil society, the schools, and the media to spread the message about
AIDS

He took active steps to fight its spread through action by the government and

other groups in society, including religious leaders and community developmentorganizations. Museveni and his administration encouraged each to tackle AIDS in ways
that made best use of their particular skills.

This broad-based approach to the epidemic

contributed to a reduction in HIV infections.^"
At the same time, Museveni fulfilled the second aspect of WHO AFRO's
recommendation. The government strengthened the health infrastructure. The new
agencies Museveni created are semi-autonomous. The first government structured effort
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to address the epidemic occurred in 1986. The government established the first AIDSControl Program in the Ministry of Health/' The program focused on safe blood,
prevention of HIV infection in health care settings, information, education, and
communication. Soon, the government response expanded. Museveni recognized that
the impact of the epidemic went beyond the health sector and planned and implemented
relevant activities in other sectors. His government established The AIDS Support
Organization (TASO) in 1987 to provide psychosocial support for people affected by
AIDS, and in 1992 adopted the Multisectoral Approach to the Control of AIDS (MACA)
as a policy and strategy for responding to the epidemic.
Museveni inspires, motivates, and stimulates community action and participation
through personal persuasion, valuing emotions as well as ideas. Uganda showed that
educational programs could change sexual behavior after AIDS had struck in vast
numbers.

Studies now demonstrate that Ugandan youth are learning safer sexual

behavior—later initiation, fewer partners, and more condom use.^'* Safer sexual behavior
has led to lower national HIV prevalence rates in Uganda. Yearly updates of HIV
seroprevalence at the regional and national level, which have shown a consistent decline
in HIV prevalence rates since 1993, are published by UNAIDS.The publication of
Uganda's AIDS data fulfills WHOAFRO's third recommendation, to exchange
information, including reporting of AIDS cases.
In South Africa, the situation is much more bleak. After a relatively slow start, South
Africa now has one of the fastest growing HIV infection rates in the world. In KwazuluNatal province, the region with the greatest incidence of AIDS, demographers have
established that because of AIDS, deaths are now exceeding births. Government

90

response to the growing AIDS crisis has been lack-luster and controversial.^'' South
Africa's President, Thabo Mbeki, has failed to fulfill any of Gordon's characteristics of
an effective and creative leader or help his administration complete the 1986 WHOAFRO
recommendations.
Denial, ministerial wrangling, and the misallocation of resources characterize South
Africa's governmental response under President Mbeki to the AIDS epidemic.^' South
Africa has complied with two of WHO AFRO's three recommendations, but did so before
Mbeki became president. Initial assessment at the national level occurred for the first
time in 1990 under the apartheid regime.The UNAIDS/WHO Working Group on
Global HIV/AIDS and STI Surveillance continues to conduct national sentinel
surveillance. The Working Group assesses prevalence rates at the provincial and national
levels, and UNAIDS publishes the results annually
Despite realizing important aspects of WHOAFRO s 1986 recommendation, Mbeki
gives no leadership and denies the scale of the problem.

The government has failed to

fulfill WHOAFRO's second recommendation, to strengthen the health infrastructure in
order to support prevention activities and educational and information programs. In
August 2001, Mbeki ordered a re-examination of health and social policy, spending, and
research in the light of figures on deaths from AIDS.^' In a letter to his health minister
that he wrote on August 6, 2001, Mbeki chose HIV/AIDS mortality figures from 1995,
when deaths were considerably fewer than in 2001 and when figures did not include the
many deaths from disease related to AIDS. He instructed the health minister to look at
the 1995 figures, when AIDS was shown as accounting for only 2.2 percent of deaths in
South Africa, and consider whether the current health polices dealt adequately with
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preventing death, given the chief causes of death in the country He then questioned
whether priorities for heath and social spending were appropriate. Finally, he asked
whether state-funded medical research was appropriate.^^
The letter repeated a proposal from the presidential AIDS panel to question AIDS
figures "that are regularly peddled as a true representation of what is happening in our
country " The letter continued, "Needless to say, these figures will provoke a howl of
displeasure and a concerted propaganda campaign among those who have convinced
themselves that HIV/AIDS is the single biggest cause of death in our country
Effective leadership does not cost money

However, implementation of creative and

effective leadership policies does. The government's inaction, despite strong global
criticism bewilders many Money may not be the only reason Mbeki has ignored the
problem. Another reason may be cultural. His unwillingness to talk about condoms and
encourage people to take HIV tests reflects his unease over how outsiders view Africa.^'
Mbeki's autocratic style of leadership has impeded the government's abihty to establish
an effective strategy to deal with the HIV/AIDS epidemic there. Several members of the
cabinet privately admit that the government's approach is wrong. Leaked documents
from the health ministry in September 2001 suggested that many there believe the
government's policy is politically dangerous. However, the president alone is able to
freeze policy, and loyalty compels most ministers to follow his lead.^^ The result is that
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa is rapidly escalating and the population is
feeling its demographic and social impact.
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Results of Presidential Leadership in Uganda and South Africa
Within one year of taking office, Museveni implemented and led a nationwide
mobilization against AIDS in a program called "Abstain, Be Faithful, or wear a
Condom,"—the "ABC's." Trends in behavioral indicators such as delayed sexual
initiation, a decrease in the number of sexual partners, and increased condom use among
sexually active people are all positive in Uganda.In South Africa, behavior has been
slow to change. "The ABC's" have paid off in Uganda. The country's pioneering efforts
in combating AIDS changed social mores: teenagers are postponing sex, casual sex is
declining, and unmarried adults are practicing abstinence.

The most important

behavioral change related to lower percentages of 15-19 year-olds having sex, a higher
percentage of people delaying sex until after marriage, and fewer non-regular partners.
Between 1989 and 1995, the proportion of 15-19 year-olds who reported never having
had sex increased from 26 percent to 46 percent for girls and from 31 percent to 56
percent for boys.'*^ Women aged 15-24 have also delayed sexual intercourse or abstained
completely according to a UN AIDS report published in December 2002."*' For the
youngest, the 15 year-olds, the proportion of boys or girls reporting that they had never
had sex rose from around 20 percent to 50 percent between 1989 to 1995.''^
The most striking epidemiological feature of Uganda's success is the drastic reduction
in multiple partnering by Ugandan adults. Among women aged 15 and above, the
number reporting multiple sexual partners fell from 18.4 percent in 1989 to 8.1 percent in
1995 to 2.5 percent in 2000.Between 1989 and 1995, the proportion of men who
reported sex outside a regular partnership in the previous twelve months fell from 22.6
percent to 18 .1 percent respectively The number of additional sexual partners tended to
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be fewer—the mean number falling from 2.3 in 1989 to 2.0 in 1995/*'* In 2000, while the
average Ugandan girl becomes sexually active at the age of 17—about one year older
than was the case a decade ago—the rate of marriage among girls aged 15-19 is 76
percent.'*^ Condom use also increased.
The John's Hopkins School for Public Health reports that promoting condoms is
effective in lowering HIV/AID S rates and spotlights Uganda as an example of a
successful campaign."*^ There, voluntary testing occurs, and condoms are distributed.
More and more men and women of all ages are now using condoms. In 1997, some 14
million condoms were distributed in a country of 19 million people.The proportion of
people reporting that they had used a condom at least once rose from 15 to 55 percent for
men and from 6 to 39 percent for women."*^ Condom use by single women aged 15-24
almost doubled between 1995 and 2000/2001

The percentage of teenage girls who had

ever used a condom tripled between 1994 and 1997, and more teenage girls reported
condom use than any other age group, indicating that acceptability of condoms is
growing more rapidly among young people. Lifetime condom use among the men who
have sex with these women also rose, more than doubling in all age groups between 1994
and 1997
Museveni took a leadership role that has had a tremendous impact on the anti-AIDS
campaign.^' His frank discussion about AIDS encouraged Ugandans to develop personal
behavioral strategies, which dramatically reduced HIV prevalence. In a country where
parents once would not discuss sex with their children, they now discuss sex and
HIV/AIDS almost routinely all over Uganda/^ Personal communication networks
through which people acquire knowledge about AIDS relate to and drive these changes.
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The main communication channel is discussion with family and friends. While 90
percent of Ugandans have these discussions, less than 35 percent of South Africans do/"^
The political and social climate in South Africa has been slow to change. The
government has been accused of stifling non-governmental actions with bureaucratic
restrictions. Social stigmatization runs high.^^ The lack of effective leadership in South
Africa has led to a similar lack in personal dialogue about AIDS there. In South Africa,
mothers bring their sexually active daughters to family planning clinics without having
discussed with the daughters why they need to go, and without being able to tell the clinic
staff why they have brought their daughters."^ In these circumstances, most parents do
not wish the government to admit to the existence of adolescent sex, let alone facilitate it
or reduce the risks by providing condoms. Many church leaders concur This attitude
has presented AIDS programs with great difficulties."^ Subsequently, sexual behavior in
South Africa has remained dangerous, and condom use low
A startling proportion of South African women's first sexual experiences involve
violence, which not only means that contraception is out of the question, but greatly
enhances the chance of HIV transmission.^^ In one South African study, around 85
percent of both men and women said that use of condoms could prevent AIDS, and high
proportions of respondents had multiple partners or believed that their regular partner was
unfaithful, but over 60 percent of both men and women had never used a condom.
While half of all the men said they intended to use a condom every time they had sex
with a casual partner, only 16 percent of them actually did so.^ Attitudes about HIV,
sex, and condoms have been slow to change in South Africa.
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Condoms are associated with illicit sex and promiscuity They are thus unlikely to be
used in stable, ongoing relationships. These negative attitudes are major obstacles to the
development of condom use as a means of protecting against the spread of HIV

In

2001, one urban South African male stated, "Condoms waste time and you don't enjoy
sex."*'^ Another man said condoms indicate a lack of trust.

It is manifestly practically

impossible for most women to ask their partners to use a condom; men turn nearly always
such requests against them. They accuse their partners of promiscuity ^ A rural man
said, "If my girlfriend gave me a condom I cannot accept it. This means she is a
prostitute."^" Another one said, "If she talks about that with me, I will hit her because she
has no right to talk to me about that. A man will always be a man."^ Behavior change is
indicative of national prevalence rates. Where people have not modified their behavior,
rates increase.

Leadership and National HIV Prevalence rates in Uganda and South Africa
Uganda's experience underlines the fact that even a rampant HIV/AIDS epidemic can
be brought under control. The axis of any effective response is a prevention strategy that
draws upon the explicit and strong commitment of leaders at all levels, is built on
community mobilization, and extends into every area of the country

High political

commitment, coupled with prompt action in Uganda shows that the AIDS epidemic is
reversible.^^ Between 1991 and 1996, the percentage of pregnant women testing positive
for HIV in some urban areas dropped by half from about 30 percent to fifteen percent.^^
By 1999, Uganda cut HIV/AIDS prevalence from double-digit figures to around nine
percent, and in some age groups by half

96

At one time Uganda had the highest AIDS infection rate in the world. While most
other countries experienced an increase in HIV/AIDS, Uganda experienced a decrease 25
percent in the HIV infection rate compared with the rate in the 1980s/' By 2001, the
number of pregnant Ugandan women testing positive for HIV antibodies fell from 21.2
percent in 1991 to 6.2 percent.'^ In the capital, Kampala, HIV prevalence rates fell nine
consecutive years, from 29 5 percent in 1992 to 11.25 percent in 2001

On May 14,

2002, Museveni announced in Washington, DC., that Uganda's HIV/AID S infection
rate, which peaked in 1992 at more than 30 percent, decreased to 6.1 percent in 2002/''
Uganda's prevention model has the potential to reduce the AIDS rate in Africa's worst
stricken countries by 80 percent—the same level of efficacy one might expect from an
HIV vaccine.
In South Africa, the situation is desperate. Lack of strong presidential leadership has
meant little change in sexual behavior among South Africans or attitude changes about
HIV/AIDS. The death rate is climbing, life expectancy falling, and the reality of more
than a million AIDS orphans is clamoring for the attention of a nation,^'' If the current
HIV prevalence rate of about 20 percent continues, the lifetime risk of AIDS death for 15
year-old boys in South Africa is 65 percent.There, HIV prevalence in antenatal clinics
continues to rise. The prevalence-rate among 20-24 year-olds increased from around two
percent in 1991 to around 16 percent in 1995 to close to 30 percent in 2001

For 25-29

year-olds, HIV prevalence rates have followed a similar pattern, increasing from two
percent in 1991 to 20 percent in 1995 to more than 30 percent in 2001 ^ UNAIDS
projects that overall HIV prevalence rates for adults age 15-59 year-olds, which increased
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from 0.2 percent in 1990 to 4 percent in 1995 to 12 percent in 2000, will reach 18 percent
in 2005 and 22 percent in 2010.^^'

Conclusion
In the absence of massively expanded prevention, treatment, and care efforts, the
AIDS death toll is expected to continue rising before peaking at the end of this decade,^'
If the present level of government inaction continues, it is likely that 50 million Africans
will die before there is an effective vaccine, and the numbers could go much higher
still.This means that those societies will feel the worst of the epidemic's impact in the
course of the next decade and beyond. It is not too late to introduce and augment
measures that can reduce that impact. There are hopeful signs that the epidemic could
eventually be brought under control.

Thanks to the strong leadership of President

Museveni, the number of affected individuals dropped significantly in Uganda, making it
a model for other African countries in the fight against HIV/AIDS^''
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